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INTRODUCTION  
The context for this year’s Budget differs sharply from most of those in 
the past decade and a half. The global economy has been buffeted by crises 
in financial markets. Oil prices, even after recent falls, are at very high 
levels. Furthermore, the sharp decline in housing activity in Ireland carries 
negative implications both for employment and for tax revenues. A 
consequence of the changed situation is that the date of the 2009 Budget 
has been brought forward by eight weeks. This year’s Budget Perspectives 
Conference, co-hosted by The Economic and Social Research Institute and 
the Foundation for Fiscal Studies, provides several inputs to inform 
macroeconomic decision making in these challenging times. In addition, 
two longer-term issues are addressed. The first of these deals with the 
policy framework for climate change, an issue that has risen rapidly on the 
Irish policy horizon in recent years. The second issue is the effectiveness of 
public spending in achieving its objectives in the area of sport, which is 
now recognised as an important contributor to health and quality of life in 
modern society.  
 
 Developments in the global economy are of particular importance to 
Ireland, given the importance of trade in both goods and services to the 
Irish economy. In the first paper, Ray Barrell and Simon Kirby, of the 
National Institute of Economic and Social Research (NIESR) in London, 
provides an overview of the shocks which are besetting the global economy 
at present. After a long period of stability, the world economy is currently 
going through a period of financial turmoil, as banks face the consequences 
of poor lending decisions in a context of inadequate global regulation. At 
the same time, oil prices have risen to unprecedented levels. In a number of 
countries, and especially in Ireland, Spain, the United Kingdom and the 
United States, these factors are compounded by developments in the 
housing market. House prices that were buoyed by a credit boom in many 
countries over a number of years have now started to fall. The impacts on 
consumption and on housing investment are leading these economies into 
recession. Risk premia have risen in many markets, and investment is 
faltering as a consequence.  Budget deficits have increased as a result of the 
unexpected slowdown in economic growth. While some of this is cyclical, 
trend growth has also been significantly reduced by factors such as the oil 
price rise and the increase in risk premia. While public policy can seek to 
smooth over the cyclical element, public spending plans will have to be 
reined back to remain in line with trend growth, if tax rates are not to rise 
significantly.  
International  
Situation 
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 The implications of these global factors for the Irish economy, and of 
domestic factors such as the slowdown in housing activity, are dealt with in 
a presentation by Alan Barrett, Ide Kearney, Jean Goggin and Martin 
O’Brien based on the ESRI’s Autumn Quarterly Economic Commentary. As 
this is to be published on the day of the conference, details are not available 
at the time of writing. The Commentary and the presentation will give 
particular attention to the state of the public finances, and the appropriate 
stance for fiscal policy in 2009. 
Outlook for 
Ireland 
 
One issue that is of central importance in the Irish economy today is the 
appropriate size of the budget deficit for 2009. Four speakers will 
contribute to a roundtable on this issue: Ray Barrell (NIESR), Joe 
Durkan (UCD), Patrick Honohan (TCD) and Philip Lane (TCD). 
These papers and/or presentations will be available on the ESRI website. 
 
 In their paper, Lisa Ryan (Comhar), Frank Convery (UCD) and Noel 
Casserly (Comhar) point out that Irish policy on climate change is 
substantially shaped at EU level, with national targets and some key 
mechanisms coming to us from the European Union. For example, the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) has created scarcity in the market place 
for the power and heavy industry sectors, and they face a price signal per 
tonne of CO2 ‘allowance’ that tells them that reduction at a cost per tonne 
below the market price will be profitable, and that increased emissions will 
incur a heavy cost penalty. Ryan, Convery and Casserly argue that 
auctioning of allowances – not present in the current system, but included 
in proposals to revise the system post-2012 – would represent an 
improvement in the efficiency of the policy. 
Climate 
Change 
 
There is, however, some freedom of action open to Ireland in 
responding to new and demanding targets (to be achieved by 2020) 
proposed by the EU for sectors not covered by the ETS (agriculture, 
transport, waste, heat and process related emissions from residential, 
commerce and industry not in the trading scheme). Ryan, Convery and 
Casserly argue that a central element of policy in this area should be the 
introduction of a carbon levy to reach the level of the allowance price in 
the EU ETS They also suggest that if costs of reducing carbon emissions 
are substantially higher in the non-ETS sector, efficiency in achieving the 
overall target would require some flexibility between the ETS and the non-
ETS sectors; this would require a decision at European Commission level.  
 
 Achieving value for money in public expenditure is another key issue, 
whatever the state of the economic cycle.  Its importance is even more 
marked in the present situation.  In order to attain this, we must have a 
clear idea of the objectives of particular expenditure programmes, and of 
the extent to which the expenditures contribute to these objectives. This is 
the approach taken by Pete Lunn (ESRI) in assessing the economic 
returns to public investment in sport, which have increased very 
substantially over the past decade. The stated aims of Irish sports policy 
emphasise improvements in health and quality of life. There is, indeed, 
considerable empirical support for the view that there are significant health 
and social benefits to be had from participation in sport. However, the 
Sports 
Expenditure: 
Hitting the 
Target? 
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analysis challenges the way current policy addresses three trade-offs in the 
allocation of resources: the balance between “elite” and “grassroots” sport; 
the trade-off between investment in sporting facilities (physical capital) and 
participation programmes (human and social capital); and the allocation of 
public money across the range of different sporting activities. In each case, 
the evidence base suggests that the aims of policy could be better served by 
a reallocation of sports investment which takes recent research findings on 
sports participation into account.  
 
 
THE BUDGETARY 
IMPLICATIONS OF 
GLOBAL SHOCKS TO 
CYCLES AND TRENDS IN 
OUTPUT: 
Impacts of Housing, 
Financial and Oil Shocks 
Ray Barrell and Simon Kirby*  
 
 After nearly two decades of stability the world economy is going through a period of 
financial turmoil as banks face the consequences of poor lending decisions. House prices 
were buoyed by a credit boom in many countries, but they have started to fall. The impacts 
on consumption and on housing investment are leading many economies into recession. 
Risk premia have risen in many markets, and investment is faltering as a consequence. At 
the same time oil prices have risen to unprecedented levels. Budget deficits have increased as 
a result of the unexpected slowdown in economic growth. Some of this is cyclical, and can 
be ignored. However, the rise in risk premia and the oil price have together reduced trend 
growth by half to one percentage point for four to six years in many countries. Public 
spending plans will have to be reined back to remain in line with trend incomes, or tax 
rates will have to rise. Not all of the recent increases in budget deficits can be ignored, and 
they will have to be addressed once the dust has settled. 
Abstract 
 
 The OECD economies are facing three severe negative shocks to growth. 
Housing markets have been badly affected by the ending of their booms and 
house prices and housing investment are falling in a number of countries. 
Housing market problems have severe cyclical effects, but it is not clear they 
have a sustained impact on output. Of the two remaining shocks, one is 
emanating directly from financial markets whilst the other is in the form of 
1. 
Introduction 
 
* NIESR, 2 Dean Trench Street, London SW1P 3HE. 
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an unanticipated surge in oil and other commodity prices. These shocks are 
likely to have an impact over a longer period of time, and they will have an 
impact on the sustainable level of output as well as on the cyclical 
component in economic activity around sustainable, or equilibrium, output. 
When the rate of growth of an economy slows, tax receipts will be reduced 
and expenditure on social support programmes will increase. These 
automatic stabilisers are built in to the fiscal frameworks in use in Europe, 
and should help to offset the negative impacts of the shocks on output 
growth.  
 
Output falling below capacity is reasonably associated with increased 
budget deficits, and the faster the rate of increase in the output gap the 
greater the budgetary allowance that can be taken under the Stability and 
Growth Pact. Medium-term expenditure planning is best isolated from 
changes in the cyclical position of the economy. If shocks also reduce trend 
output growth then medium-term expenditure plans should change. Hence, 
it is important to be able to distinguish between the cyclical and structural 
elements in the effects of a set of shocks when looking at the budgetary 
response.  
 
We discuss the evolution of recent financial market turmoil and its effects 
on house prices. We evaluate the impacts of falling house prices on the 
economy and discuss the impact of recent declines in housing investment. 
We also look at the impact of increased credit spreads on the economy with 
an emphasis on their long term effects. We also discuss the impacts of the 
recent increase in oil prices. We conclude by arguing that the housing market 
crisis is cyclical and its impacts on the fiscal position can largely be ignored. 
However, increased risk premia and higher real oil prices impact on the 
longer-term prospects, and in most countries they require an adjustment to 
spending plans or an increase in tax rates. 
 
 House prices have been rising in almost all European countries (with the 
notable exception of Germany) and they have also risen in North America, 
as Barrell and Kirby (2008) discuss. Housing bubbles have been common in 
the UK, and were also major factors behind the Nordic banking crises of the 
early 1990s. House price bubbles are commonly associated with financial 
liberalisation and innovation and with subsequent financial crises. The recent 
bubble probably stemmed from increased lending given income levels and 
from low real interest rates on that lending. Large volumes of saving, 
especially from China and the rest of East Asia, were holding down real 
interest rates. Partly as a consequence of these low real rates we have seen a 
wave of financial innovation. Low real rates squeeze the rents banks get on 
their zero interest deposits and hence put pressure on them to innovate in 
order to maintain their profit margins. Developments in our understanding 
of risk, in combination with the pressure to innovate, have led to the 
production of new styles of assets that share and spread risk. Bundling 
mortgages into securities spreads risk, and this raises the welfare of society 
and increase the capacity to borrow.  
2. 
The Genesis 
of the 
Financial 
Crisis and 
Housing 
Bubble 
 
However, the innovations in types of assets did little to reduce the 
underlying level of risk. This may not have been apparent, and risk probably 
became under priced. The under pricing of risk became clear as default rates 
on various US issued sub prime assets began to rise, putting pressure on the 
balance sheets of the banking sector. The international nature of banking 
markets meant that many of the risky assets had been bought by European 
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banks, and losses have been larger than initially anticipated. This was 
perhaps because US banks had a better understanding of lax US bankruptcy 
and housing loan laws and they were hence, willing to pay less for these new 
assets than the less well informed Europeans. As soon as loans began to 
become more expensive, with lower loan to value ratios, in order to take 
account of higher perceived risk, house prices began to weaken. Housing 
investment had begun to fall in the US in the first quarter of 2006, but as 
credit constraints tightened in mid-2007 its decline was accelerated. 
Uncertainty over the location of the bad debts meant that banks were 
unwilling to trust each other, and interbank transactions dropped and the 
spread on wholesale borrowing has risen. This has further tightened credit 
conditions and has contributed to the cyclical slowdown of many 
economies. 
Figure 1: Housing Wealth as a Proportion of Disposable Income 
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Rising real house price can mean that the value of the owner occupied 
housing stock might rise relative to incomes (Figure 1). It can also rise if 
there is a great deal of housing investment, as in Ireland, where investment 
in housing was around 12 per cent of GDP (Table 1). If housing wealth falls 
then consumption may be affected, and hence the economy may slow down. 
There is reasonably clear evidence that housing wealth affects consumption 
in many countries, as Barrell and Davis (2007) show. Although a change in 
housing wealth driven by a change in house prices may not be national 
wealth, if individuals are myopic and do not value the inheritance they leave 
their children as much as their children would value it then housing wealth 
might be perceived as individual wealth.1 In the long run individuals appear 
to react no more to their housing than their financial wealth. However, there 
is clear evidence that there is significantly more signal in a rise in housing 
wealth driven by asset prices than in a rise in financial wealth driven by the 
same factors.  
 
It is possible to use the National Institute Global Econometric Model, 
NiGEM to evaluate the impacts of a fall in house prices, and Figure 2 
reports on the effects of a 10 per cent concerted fall. In each of these 
countries there is strong evidence that consumption depends on housing 
wealth, As Barrell and Kirby (2008) show, the impacts on consumption of a 
fall in housing wealth are between two and three times larger than the 
 
1 This is the same argument as made over whether government bonds are net wealth. 
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impact on GDP. This is largely because a high proportion of any fall in 
consumption is absorbed into imports, with the offset being larger in more 
open smaller economies. Underlying these simulations are the assumptions 
that the monetary authorities adjust interest rates in line with changes in 
demand, and that forward looking foreign exchange markets cause the 
exchange rate to jump down initially, offsetting some of the effects. Equity 
markets are also forward looking and react to the fall in interest rates that 
results from the fall in house prices. Consequently, equity market wealth 
initially jumps up to partly offset the fall in housing wealth. However, the 
offset is not large, and if the authorities did not react there would be no 
offset.  
Figure 2: Effects of a 10 Per Cent fall in House Prices on Real GDP 
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The crisis in housing markets has also led to a fall in housing investment, 
as we can see from Table 1. Housing investment has fallen most sharply in 
the US and in Ireland. UK housing investment has dropped by a more 
modest amount. Simulations on NiGEM suggest that the fall in investment 
has probably reduced US GDP growth by just over ½ percentage point. The 
effects on the UK are less, mainly because the share of housing investment 
is smaller and the decline in investment has been lower. Housing market 
downturns cause sharp and temporary declines in output, and they are 
clearly cyclical shocks. They can at minimum be ignored when policy makers 
set longer term budgetary plans, since the widening of deficits is short term 
and cyclical. The effects of a widening output gap on budget deficits 
depends on the underlying cause. Barrell, Hurst and Mitchell (2007) show 
that consumption led slowdowns have a significantly greater impact on 
deficits than those led by slower export growth. On average an expansion of 
the output gap by 5 percentage points might worsen the budget by 2½ per 
cent of GDP or so, but if the downturn is from tax rich consumption it 
could be as high as 3½ per cent of GDP. Since these are cyclical such 
budgetary changes do not need intervention to correct them. 
Table 1: Ratio of Housing Investment to GDP 
      
 France Germany Ireland UK US 
 % % % % % 
2000 4.7 6.9 12.3 4.5 4.6 
2005 5.0 5.4 13.3 4.7 5.4 
2006 5.2 5.5 12.7 5.0 4.9 
2007 5.3 5.4 10.8 5.0 3.9 
2008Q1 5.2 - 8.5 4.7 3.3 
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Given that house prices were well above fundamentals in many countries, 
and perhaps as much as 30 per cent overvalued in the UK, the fall in house 
prices is to be welcomed, and not offset as in the recent announcements by 
the UK government. In addition, the wealth effect from high and rising 
house prices has been a major factor behind low levels of savings in 
countries such as the UK and the US, and a rise in the savings ratio that will 
result from lower housing wealth is also to be welcomed in these two low 
saving countries. If politicians requiring re-election feel a need to react, or if 
they think they should stabilise the economy by taking action, then 
programmes to offset the employment effects of lower housing investment 
would make more sense than policies designed to stop house prices 
adjusting back to their equilibrium level. 
 
 Financial crises are episodic and frequent, and are difficult to avoid without 
major impacts on the prospects for financial innovation and economic 
growth. Financial innovation can reduce borrowing costs which lowers the 
user cost of capital, and hence for a period at least it can be important for 
raising growth. However, it is difficult to distinguish between sustainable 
innovation and excessive risk taking. Regulators have to ensure they 
encourage the former and discourage the latter. Financial sector regulation is 
extremely difficult, and financial innovation often finds ways round 
regulation. However, good regulation frequently revised to keep up with 
markets is essential if financial markets are to be constrained from 
generating a depression of the scale seen between 1929 and 1933. 
3. 
Financial 
Crises and 
the Impacts 
of Increased 
Risk Related 
Spreads 
Table 2: Selected Banking Crises and Their Effects  
     
 
 
 
  Date 
 
Duration 
Direct Cost to 
Taxpayers* 
Output Loss 
 (% of GDP) 
Japan 1991-2001 10 years 14.0  
Norway 1989-1992 4 years 3.4 27.1 
Sweden 1991-1994 4 years 2.1 3.8 
Finland 1991-1994 4 years 10.0 44.9 
     
* Per cent of annual GDP at end of episode. 
 Source: Barrell and Hurst (2008).  
 
Table 2 gives some details of four recent crises in major economies. The 
Nordic crises were sharp and had a significant effect on output, but they 
were associated with rapid and poorly designed financial deregulation that 
led to excessive consumer borrowing and housing market bubbles. The 
collapse of consumption spending that came with the pricking of asset 
bubbles was a factor behind large scale losses in the banking sectors, as were 
exposed positions in foreign exchange dealings. Real house prices fell 30 per 
cent in Finland between 1991 and 1993, whilst they fell by 25 per cent in 
Sweden over the same period. In both countries the whole banking system 
had to be nationalised. Output losses, commonly calculated as the cumulate 
drop below trend growth, were large, but there seems to have been little 
effects on longer-term growth prospects. The Japanese crisis also followed 
from ill judged deregulation and an expansion of borrowing but involved 
fewer failures but the crisis lasted for a significantly longer period. It was 
driven as much by falling commercial property prices after an extreme 
bubble as by personal sector problems, and it led to a re-evaluation of risk 
premia in Japan, raising the user cost of capital and reducing trend output 
growth for some time. The crisis probably has had a permanent effect on the 
sustainable level of output in that economy.  
  THE BUDGETARY IMPLICATIONS OF GLOBAL SHOCKS TO CYCLES AND TRENDS IN OUTPUT 9 
Figure 3 Spread between BAA corporate and government bonds 
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US Euro Area UK
 
The recent crisis that has hit Europe and North America is probably 
more similar to that experienced by Japan in the 1990s than the quick and 
deep crises in the Nordic countries. There has been a housing market 
element, as we have discussed above, but excessive lending and an under-
estimate of default risk, especially within the US, led to low risk premia for 
all borrowers. As Figure 3 shows, the spread between risk free government 
borrowing and corporate borrowing costs has risen in the US and Europe, 
as have equity premia and consumer borrowing costs. This looks like a 
medium to long term re-evaluation of risk, and it will raise the user cost of 
capital, and reduce the equilibrium level of the capital stock and hence 
sustainable output. 
Table 3: Impacts of a 2.0 Sustained Rise in Risk Premia on Output 
       
 Euro 
Area 
France Germany Ireland UK US 
2008 -0.3 -0.3 -0.3 -0.1 -0.3 -0.4 
2009 -0.8 -0.6 -0.7 -0.3 -0.9 -0.8 
2010-13 -1.2 -1.0 -1.0 -1.3 -1.7 -0.8 
       
NiGEM simulation – per cent difference from baseline. 
Interest rate rules in place, forward looking financial and labour markets. 
 
Barrell and Hurst (2008) discuss the impacts of a rise of spreads of this 
scale on output, but look only at the effects of a temporary change. It looks 
increasingly as if the crisis in financial markets will have a long-term impact 
on risk premia, as in Japan in the 1990s. Hence, we have repeated the 
simulations, but have extended them into the medium term to investigate 
the impacts on sustainable output. In this scenario risk premia were raised 
by 2 percentage points over the medium to long term in Europe and North 
10 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2009 
America.2 As a result of this both investment and consumption would fall. 
The user cost of capital would have risen by less than 2 percentage points as 
long-term risk free real interest rates would fall in response to lower 
investment and higher saving. As we can see from Table 3 sustainable 
output would fall by more than one per cent in the Euro Area and by less in 
the US, reflecting higher capital output ratios in the former area. Permanent 
changes in output require permanent changes in government spending, and 
these are implemented in the model, so deficits do not rise.  
 
 Between the end of 2006 and September 2008 oil prices rose from around 
$50 per barrel to a currently projected level of $113 in 2009. Oil prices 
reached a peak of $144 a barrel in July before falling back over the summer. 
These recent oil price increases have taken the real oil price back to, or 
above the levels seen in the 1980s, as we can see from Figure 4 which plots 
the exchange rate adjusted real oil price for the UK, the US and the Euro 
Area. The recent strength of the euro has meant that the full impact of the 
rise in the dollar oil price has been partly offset by the exchange rate, but 
even there oil prices are likely to remain high. However, high real oil prices 
may be less significant than they were in the 1970s, largely because oil (or 
rather fossil fuel) use has fallen as a percentage of output, as can be seen 
from Table 4.3  
4. 
Oil and the 
Economy 
Figure 4: Real Oil Prices in Domestic Currencies 2000 = 1.0 
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Fossil fuel use is more important in the US than in Europe, and its share 
of nominal costs has risen from 3 per cent in 1995 to a projected 12 per cent 
in 2008. If prices were just a mark up over costs, and if there were no 
second round effects, and no monetary policy response, then the $53 dollar 
rise in oil prices between the end of 2006 and September 2008 would 
suggest that the overall price level should rise by 4 per cent in the USA, by 2 
 
2 The same policy and expectations assumptions were used as in the previous scenario. 
3 These calculations assume that coal and gas prices are free to move in line with oil prices, 
but until the 1980s they clearly were not in many countries, and actual expenditure may 
have been lower as a per cent of GDP. 
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per cent in the UK, and somewhere between the two in the Euro Area and 
Japan. Second round effects on prices could increase the impact of the 
increase in oil prices if nominal wage growth rose markedly  because real 
wages were not adjusting quickly  to their new, lower, equilibrium  trajectory.  
Table 4: Share of Fossil Fuels in GDP 
       
 Euro 
Area 
 France  Germany  Japan  UK  USA 
 % % % % % % 
1975 6.0 4.0 3.0 4.8 6.7 7.8 
1980 10.1 7.1 7.5 8.1 9.7 16.3 
1985 7.9 4.8 8.2 4.6 8.1 7.5 
1990 2.7 1.7 2.8 1.9 3.1 4.9 
1995 1.5 1.0 1.4 0.9 2.1 3.1 
2000 3.1 2.2 3.0 1.8 2.8 4.2 
2005 3.8 2.6 3.8 3.6 3.5 6.4 
2006 4.4 3.0 4.5 4.6 4.0 7.3 
2007 4.1 2.8 4.2 5.1 3.7 7.9 
2008 5.8 3.8 5.9 7.4 5.7 12.1 
       
Oil, coal gas in oil equivalents, valued at world market prices. 
 
Increases in oil prices change the terms of trade between oil producers 
and oil consumers, and also affect the productive capacity of the economy to 
produce output as fewer non-labour inputs are likely to be used. In countries 
that do not produce fossil fuels this change in the terms of trade is reflected 
in the balance of payments, and both real wages and real incomes must 
adjust. If they do not then unemployment will rise noticeably, as it did after 
the oil price shocks of the 1970s. In the Euro Area the rise in the price of oil 
between 2006 and 2008 means that the terms of trade have changed by 1.8 
per cent (the rise in the nominal share of fossil fuels over that period) and 
real wages and real incomes must grow less rapidly than they otherwise 
would. For instance real wage growth would have to be ½ a percentage 
point lower for four years than had been anticipated in 2006 in order to 
accommodate the oil price increase.  
 
The change in the terms of trade is much more important in the US, 
where real wages would have to grow one percentage point less rapidly than 
had been anticipated in 2006. The US is a significant fossil fuel producer, 
and real income growth would not have to slow down so much, but real 
incomes would still have to be around three percentage points lower than 
they would otherwise have been in four years time. The UK remains almost 
self sufficient in fossil fuels, and real incomes would fall only marginally. 
However, real (producer price adjusted) wage growth would still have to fall 
by around half a percentage point a year for four years. The rate of growth 
of incomes of pensioners and other who are dependent on oil rents 
(including the average tax payer) would not decline anywhere near as much.  
 
If oil prices had stayed at their April 2008 levels then output growth 
would have been stronger, and the rate of inflation lower. The exact 
magnitudes depend upon the policy reactions of the monetary authorities 
and on how wage bargainers respond. In the 1970s neither policy makers 
nor wage bargainers seemed to take account of the need for lower real wage 
growth, and as a result the rate of inflation rose markedly as bargains 
attempted to keep real wage growth on track and the monetary authorities 
tried to keep real interest rates constant.  
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If oil prices had not peaked in July 2008 and were $33 dollars lower now 
then inflation pressures would have been less. Figure 5 reports the impacts 
of such a change on inflation and output. The counterfactual implies that 
higher oil prices have raised inflation and reduced output. We assume policy 
makers would have cut interest rates, and that wage bargains would take 
account of the changed real prospects Rational expectations drive labour 
and financial markets, and agents know the real equilibrium and what the 
reactions of the authorities will be. The cyclical reactions of the economy 
will depend on how much the authorities change interest rates and how 
much labour bargains adjust to changes. The effects on output and prices 
depend on the oil intensity of production, with the largest effects being seen 
in the US. The US has the most flexible labour and product markets in this 
group, and hence prices rise more rapidly. Lower levels of demand will 
reduce budgets, with one per cent lower output being associated with a 
larger deficit of 0.5 to 0.7 per cent of GDP. It is important to know how 
much of this effect is permanent. 
Figure 5: Impacts of Oil Prices Having Risen by Around $33 pb 
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Sustained increases in oil prices will reduce the level of output that can be 
produced. Equilibrium output depends on the level of inputs that can be 
sustained in the medium term, and it is useful to undertake some simple 
growth accounting. Barrell, Kirby and Liadze (2008) report on the volume 
and value shares for fossil fuels in a number of economies, and we also 
know the share of labour over time. It is possible to use these in the same 
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way as Barrell et al. (2008) to look at the impact of oil prices on output. 
Output growth in an accounting framework is explained by the share inputs 
take in output multiplied by the rate of change in the input, and moving 
average shares of fossil fuel, labou
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r and capital in output allow us to 
onstruct a Tornquist output index.  
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Area than it otherwise would have been as a result of higher oil prices.   
Figure 6: 
s by 2010 of an Increase of $50 in Oil Prices from $63 in 
2006) 
d wage pressures will be higher and unemployment will 
rise, as in the 1970s. 
c
Over time fossil fuel inputs change, and they do so in part because their 
prices change. Weale (2008) suggests that the long-run elasticity of demand 
for fossil fuels has to be around minus one. It is clear, however, that 
adjustment is slow. We estimate it can take 4 years for 66 per cent of any 
adjustment to take place. If oil prices had not risen from their 2006 levels 
then more oil would be used as an input into production, and more goods 
could be produced. We have calculated the change in fossil fuel use that 
would take place between 2006 and 2010 in the light of these assumptions 
and used it in a growth accounting exercise. We first assume that oil usage 
drops in line with price increases, and calculate a trajectory for output. We 
then assume prices and shares do not change, and hence usage remains at 
2006 levels. Figure 6 plots the impacts of these changes on the projected 
level of equilibrium output in 2010. The impacts are highest in the oil 
intensive USA and lowest in nuclear intensive France. In the very long run 
we would expect equilibrium output to be up to 2 per cent lower in the E
 
Oil Price Impacts on Equilibrium Output   
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Our results on the short, medium and long-term impacts of higher oil 
prices suggest that much of the impact, even in the short term, must be seen 
as structural and not cyclical. If sustainable output is likely to be 2 per cent 
lower than it would otherwise have been, then optimally organised 
government spending also needs to be 2 per cent lower than currently, 
otherwise government budgets would deteriorate. Ignoring the impacts of 
oil prices on trend output is as serious as ignoring its effects on real wages. If 
spending plans do not adjust then taxes will have to rise, and this will put 
downward pressure on real consumption wages. If bargainers resist the 
effects of oil price increases they will also resist the impacts of increased 
taxes, and for a perio
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Figure 7: Fossil Fuel Use in Irish GDP 
he impacts 
ending would be the same 
made taxes will 
have to rise to keep the public fiancés on a sustainable path. 
 
It is possible to make a simple estimate of the impact of higher oil prices 
on Irish output, although growth accounting is made difficult both by the 
absence of an easily available and long series for output at basic prices. This 
problem is exacerbated by the discrepancy of perhaps 14 per cent between 
national output and national income that comes from the prevalence of 
profit shifting through the Irish accounts. Given these problems we should 
treat Figure 7 with care, as it probably understates the role of energy in the 
Irish economy. As in earlier exercises, we take oil, coal and gas usage and 
value it at world market prices and compare to money GDP. This gives an 
energy intensity of output that is similar to the UK. In the longer term the 
rise in the oil price between 2006 and 2008 will require trend output in 
Ireland to be around 2 per cent or so lower, and hence that trend output 
grows by up to half a percentage point less a year for four years. T
on optimally organised government sp
 
 Recent shocks to financial, housing and oil markets have caused growth to 
slow markedly in a number of economies. The shocks related to the housing 
market are probably cyclical in their effects, and their impacts on budget 
deficits can be treated with neglect. However, over the last two years there 
appears to have been a sea change in both the real oil price and in risk 
premia applied to investment. Between them these structural shocks have 
reduced sustainable output growth by between ½ and 1 per cent a year, 
depending on the economy considered. By 2010 sustainable output in the 
European economies is likely to be 2 to 3 per cent lower than had been 
projected in 2006, whilst the effect on the US would be around 4 per cent. 
Real wage growth has to slow to accommodate this. In addition, government 
spending plans have to be adjusted or taxes will have to rise. If the 
government’s share of output is to remain constant then spending plans 
must be revised down, with spending growing ½ to 1 per cent slower in real 
terms than projected in 2006. If such adjustments are not 
5. 
Summ
and 
ary 
Conclusions 
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MOBILISING MARKET-
BASED INSTRUMENTS 
FOR CLIMATE CHANGE 
IN IRELAND 
Lisa Ryan, Frank Convery and Noel Casserly 
 
 As regards climate change, we are facing a carbon constrained world where ‘do nothing’ 
is not an option. Our national targets and mechanisms have come to us from the 
European Union. The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has 
created scarcity in the market place for the power and heavy industry sectors, and they 
face a price signal per tonne of CO2 (‘allowance’) that tells them that reduction at a cost 
per tonne below the market price will be profitable, and increased emissions will cost. The 
response as to how to deal with this situation is left entirely up to the firms involved. This 
flexibility is crucially important to support innovation and competitiveness. The 
European Commission’s proposals for EU ETS post 2012 include auctioning of 
allowances – in particular in regard to the power sector – and centralisation of cap-
setting. We support these proposals.  
Abstract 
 
Very demanding targets are now proposed by the Commission for the non-trading 
sector (agriculture, transport, waste, heat and process related emissions from residential, 
commerce and industry not in the trading scheme), to be achieved by 2020. This EU-
originating target should supersede the national target set in the Programme for 
Government of an 86 per cent reduction from 2007 by 2010. We propose that the same 
flexibility and support for innovation that exists for the trading sectors apply also to the 
non-trading sectors, achieved by the immediate introduction of a carbon levy to reach the 
level of the allowance price in the EU ETS, with the revenues used to: reduce other taxes 
(40 per cent), address fuel poverty (30 per cent) and further support reduction in 
greenhouse gas emissions (30 per cent). The latter should be focused on the least cost 
opportunities and research and development. The levy on transport might later be replaced 
by an individualised cap and trade scheme. If the costs of abatement at the margin are 
substantially higher in the non-trading sector, then some flexibility between the trading 
and non-trading sectors should be sought from the European Commission. Time is not 
on our side, so action in Budget 2009 is important.  
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 The excessive emission of greenhouse gases is a manifestation of market 
failure which arises as a result of the public good nature of greenhouse gas 
emissions. In a well-functioning market resources are allocated efficiently1 
but well-defined property rights are necessary for this to occur, which is 
generally not the case with public goods such as greenhouse gas emissions.  
1. 
Introduction 
 
The essence of markets is that they clear – a price emerges that brings 
demand and supply into equilibrium. If demand increases and supply does 
not, then the market price rises to bring them into equilibrium. If supply 
increases and demand does not, then the price falls. The market fails when 
a price does not emerge that reflects relative scarcity. This is typically the 
case with environmental endowments. They are often not ‘owned’ and as 
use intensifies, no price signal emerges to alert consumers to use them 
more parsimoniously, or bring use into balance with assimilative capacity. 
In regard to climate change, we emit gases into the atmosphere that warm 
the globe, and we do not get a price signal telling us that the capacity to 
assimilate these gases without the risk of substantive adverse effect is 
limited and is being overused.  
 
This paper is about ways in which we correct for market failure by 
creating a price that signals scarcity, and what the implications are for fiscal 
and budgetary policy. Specifically, we address two choices: limiting quantity 
of emissions, and allowing trading amongst emitters, thereby producing a 
price, or introducing the price directly in the form of a tax per unit of 
pollution emitted.  
 
 Although historically the most common instrument implemented in the 
area of environmental policy has been command and control policies, these 
have been found to frequently be inefficient. Standard regulation can be 
statically inefficient in that it may not achieve environmental objectives at 
minimum cost, and it may be dynamically inefficient, since there may be no 
incentive for polluters to continually improve. In latter years demand-side 
market-based instruments such as taxes, green subsidies, and emissions 
trading have become more popular, as they provide an incentive to 
continually improve environmental performance at least cost. The revenue 
generated by market-based instruments can provide a double dividend if 
they are used to reduce other taxes which may be slowing economic 
growth2 or creating inequity in society. 
2. 
Market-
based Policy 
Instruments 
for 
Greenhouse 
Gas 
Mitigation  
 
There are several features that distinguish greenhouse gas emissions 
from other problems. First, the pollutants act globally and, therefore, a 
successful abatement strategy requires a large majority of emitting countries 
to cooperate and abate, which complicates the political implementation of 
policy measures. Additionally, CO2 emissions3 are mainly a direct result of 
 
1We may define efficiency in terms of Pareto optimality, which is the situation where we 
are unable to reallocate resources without making at least one person worse off.  
2An example is the eco tax in Germany where a tax was levied on fossil fuels and the 
revenue was used to reduce labour taxes. 
3There are six groups of greenhouse gases listed under the United Nations Framework 
Convention for Climate Change and CO2 emissions are estimated to be responsible for 60 
per cent of the ‘greenhouse effect’ (www.UNFCCC.org). 
18 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2009 
the combustion of fossil fuels and, therefore, are essentially a by-product of 
the industrial world. Abatement is different to that of other pollutants since 
end-of-pipe abatement of greenhouse gas emissions is expensive and, 
therefore, modifications to the combustion process are usually necessary, 
such as improvement in energy efficiency or fuel switching. However, this 
kind of abatement can provide side benefits, since more efficient 
combustion also saves the operator energy or fuel costs, and may also 
reduce other pollutants. A third feature of greenhouse gas emissions is that 
the consequences of abatement or lack of it will not be felt in the present 
but in the future. 
 
In an ideal world the optimal emissions abatement level can be 
estimated by comparing the marginal cost and marginal benefit of the best 
available abatement technology. However, there is generally great 
uncertainty with respect to the shape and position of the marginal benefit 
and marginal abatement cost curves. Often the abatement costs are not 
known to the policymaker, due to incomplete information on abatement 
technologies. In many cases also the technology has not been fully 
developed and, therefore, the future costs of abatement may not yet be 
known even to the manufacturer. The marginal cost of abatement curve 
may be neither smooth nor linear, since abatement technologies may be 
much more costly for increasing abatement levels. Furthermore, as private 
agents are not faced with the full social costs of greenhouse gas emissions, 
the private damage costs usually do not equal the social damage costs. It 
may be very difficult to estimate the damage costs, both social and private, 
since the cost function in the real world is most likely non-linear and 
dependent on the number of ‘victims’, time, pollutant composition and 
perhaps location (Sterner, 2003). An important consideration in the 
estimation of greenhouse gas emissions costs is uncertainty regarding the 
future concentration of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere as a result of 
current emissions, and the implications. The intertemporal dimension adds 
complexity to the issue since it is not certain what the impact of any given 
greenhouse gas concentration will have on future global and regional 
climates. Weitzman4 poses the intellectual and empirical challenge when 
catastrophe is a possibility: 
 
Societies and ecosystems whose mean ambient temperature has changed in the 
geologically instantaneous time of two centuries or so by 11c-20c are located in 
terra incognita, since such high average temperatures have not existed for 
hundreds of millions of years and such a rate of global temperature change might 
be unprecedented even on a time scale of billions of years. Standard conventional 
Cost Benefit Analyses (CBAs) of climate change do not come even remotely 
close to grappling seriously with this kind of potential for disasters. When 
comprehensive CBA includes plausible, if unknown, probabilities of (and 
plausible, if unknown, damages from) catastrophic climate change, the policy 
implications can be radically different from the conventional advice coming out of 
a standard economic analysis that essentially ignores this kind of potential for 
disasters.  
 
4Weitzman, Martin, 2008. “On Modelling and Interpreting the Economics of Catastrophic 
Climate Change”, Harvard University May 2008. 
 See: http://www.economics. harvard.edu/faculty/weitzman/files/REStatModeling.pdf 
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Standard environmental economics textbooks tell us that the optimal 
level of greenhouse gas emissions abatement is at the point where the 
marginal abatement cost is equal to the marginal damage cost. In the case 
of optimal regulation, the pollution standards could be set to the optimal 
level. Similarly, if a policy instrument of taxes or charges were preferred, 
the charge would be set at optimal t*5 to produce the optimal abatement 
level or if a system of permits were implemented the quantity of permits 
issued would be equal to the same emissions level. So, theoretically at least, 
under ideal conditions the optimal abatement level can be achieved with 
either a tax or permit-based system.  
 
In the real world, conditions are rarely ideal and policymakers must 
settle for a second or even third best policy solution. This is because, even 
if it were possible to estimate the optimal abatement level, there are often 
political constraints related to the implementation of the first best policy 
selected using the criteria above. Particular conditions, for example the 
socio-economic situation, information availability and structure, technology 
availability, environmental problem at hand, and political system demand 
different policy instruments. 
 
Our perspective takes as given the European Union policy framework in 
which we find ourselves in Ireland in 2008. This is far from what many 
economists would regard as optimal if we could design and implement 
policy from a tabula rasa. Going back to Weitzman (1974), there is a 
literature which makes the case for the use of environmental taxes rather 
than emissions trading as a means of addressing climate change. There is 
also a very convincing case that, on grounds of both economic efficiency 
and environmental effectiveness, if emissions trading is to be used, it 
should apply to all emissions. Our reality is that there is no EU-wide 
greenhouse gas tax and little prospect of same, and the emissions trading 
scheme is only partial in coverage. 
 
Given this context, the next sections describe the market-based policy 
options available for Ireland and outline their potential to efficiently and 
effectively reduce greenhouse gas emissions while improving 
competitiveness and social equity. The first of these approaches is called 
‘emissions trading’ to which we now turn. 
 
 In Annex A, we discuss what emissions trading is, the context and 
pressures which produced a European Union Emissions Trading Scheme 
(EU ETS) for carbon dioxide, the main greenhouse gas, how it has been 
implemented and how it has operated in terms of price effects, abatement, 
creation of markets etc. Readers who are not familiar with trading in 
general, and the European scheme in particular, should read this annex 
before proceeding.   
3. 
Emissions 
Trading in 
Ireland  
 
The questions that are interesting to address in regard to Ireland’s 
performance and potential vis-à-vis EU ETS include the following: 
 
 
5When the charge or tax is set at the intersection of the marginal abatement cost and 
marginal damage cost the tax is referred to as a Pigouvian tax. 
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How well did Irish companies adapt to the market over the 3 year pilot 
phase in terms of transactions, and in accessing allowances from a variety 
of sources? 
 
Are utilities in Ireland capturing surpluses in the form of price increases 
that reflect the cost of allowances, but getting the allowances mostly for 
free? 
 
If so, should there be an attempt to use the tax system to capture some or 
all of such surpluses? 
 
Are there changes proposed for the system that Ireland should support or 
oppose? 
 
Is there evidence for, or a prospect of, competitiveness issues, nationally or 
sectorally? 
 
If a carbon tax is introduced, should it apply to those in the trading 
scheme? 
  
Taking each of these in turn: 
 
Trading Performance of Irish Companies in the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) during the First (Pilot) Phase, 2005-
2007. 
 
The net balance in volume and cash terms is shown in Table 1 below: 
 
Table 1: Net Balance in Allowances over the First (Pilot) Phase, EU ETS, 
Ireland  
    
Year Average Price Per 
Tonne € 
Net Volume Net Value 
  000 Tonnes 000 € 
    
2005 20.6 406 -8,373 
2006 16.6 -229 3,797 
2007 0.6 733 -440 
Total 5.5 911 -5,016 
    
Source: Community Independent Transactions Log (CITL).  
 
For the whole period, Ireland had a net expenditure of just over €5 
million and net purchases of 911,000 tonnes, at average cost per tonne of 
€5.50. There were net sales in 2006, when prices were relatively high, and 
the largest net purchases took place in 2007 when prices were at their 
lowest. In EU ETS, installations receive their annual allocations in 
February, but do not have to balance their account for the previous year 
until April, which means they can de facto borrow allowances, and many 
seem to have borrowed forward to avail of the much cheaper allowances in 
2007. We can conclude that, overall, companies were either lucky or good, 
or perhaps both, at reducing the costs of meeting their commitments.  
 
As regards selling allowances, this happened in the context of an overall 
short situation. 
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ELECTRICITY PRICE PASS THROUGH 
For the pilot phase, the Commission on Energy Regulation (CER) only 
allowed the marginal cost – the cost of the net purchases of allowances – to 
be passed on to consumers. However, the situation changed in regard to 
the second phase (2008-2012) and thereafter. This is in the context that, 
overall, utilities were left short in the sense that allocations were lower than 
historic emissions in this second phase. 
  
A good sense of the key issues and challenges for the future can be 
discerned by examining the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
publication, Ireland’s National Allocation Plan Second Consultation, October 2 
2007,6  which applies to the 2008-2012 period.  
 
The total quantity of allowances to be allocated in the period represents 
87 per cent of forecasted emissions in that period. Of the total 9 per cent 
has been ‘held back’ to cover new entrants. This provision in the EU 
scheme is controversial, as it is held by some to de facto discriminate in 
favour of polluting incumbents, on the following basis: a new entrant who 
proposes to build an emission-free plant will get no allowances, while an 
incumbent who wishes to develop a new plant with emissions can use the 
asset value of their existing free allowances to get cheap credit for the 
expansion, and get the additional emissions ‘covered’ by receipt of more 
free allowances.  
 
A total of 22.262 million allowances annually are allocated. This 
compares with 22.32 million annually allocated in the first period, a 
reduction of less than one per cent. Holders are capped as regards the 
extent to which each installation can meet their needs using linking 
mechanisms to 12, 11, and 1 per cent respectively in the power generation, 
cement and general sectors. Only 0.5 per cent of allowances will be sold, 
“to defray the expenses of administering the emissions trading scheme”. 
 
There are over 100 installations included, and we can divide them into 
power generation, cement, and the rest. The bulk of allowances go to 
electricity generating stations and cement plants. (See Annex Table 1 for 
top 17 installations, ranking based on proposed allocation for 2008-2012.)  
 
All 12 electricity installations have been allocated 68 per cent of their 
‘relevant emissions’, the latter comprising mainly their historic emissions 
(with 2003 as the key year in this regard), or their projected emissions. It is 
assumed that the contribution of renewables grows from 4.3 per cent in 
2003 to 15 per cent in 2020 and 33 per cent by 2030, and this expectation 
was accounted for in making allocations to the powergen sector.  
 
The companies involved will need to bridge whatever gap exists 
between their free allocation and their prospective emissions by a 
combination of abatement, fuel switching, purchase of allowances, and 
purchase of project-based credits from Joint Implementation (developed 
countries) or Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). 
 
 
6http://www.epa.ie/downloads/pubs/air/etu/name,23524,en.html 
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With the emergence of the all-island electricity market, it is clear that 
generators in this new market will be expected, as a condition of their 
generation licences, to bid into the all-island wholesale market at prices that 
fully factor in their short-run marginal costs (SRMC) for each half-hourly 
dispatch period. Such costs explicitly include the full opportunity cost7 of 
EUAs for each half-hour period,8 a provision which did not apply during 
the pilot (2005-07) phase. It is likely that any ‘must run’ status peat-fired 
stations would be allowed to include any Public Service Obligation (PSO) 
subvention as a negative marginal cost.   
 
However, the overall bidding principle of SRMC is quite clear. Under 
this system, electricity consumers will pay at least some of the opportunity-
cost value of allowances, even where the utilities have not had to pay for 
them. It is important from an environmental performance point of view 
that households will face and experience the costs of emitting CO2 into the 
atmosphere associated with their consumption of electricity. It is also 
appropriate that the charge will vary depending on the carbon intensity of 
electricity generation. Under a system where permits are issued without 
cost to the electricity companies, it was the pass through of the opportunity 
cost of free allowances in the pilot phase that encouraged Germany, the 
UK and Italy to auction a significant proportion of their allowances (up to 
10 per cent is allowed under EU ETS regulation). But Ireland is only selling 
0.5 per cent of its allocation, so there is not a direct substantial flow to the 
Exchequer. 
 
Where does the public interest lie in regard to the pass through? Pass 
through encourages reduction in electricity consumption, and should be 
allowed; it confronts the consumer with the marginal costs of abatement.  
But should the government claw back some or all of this pass through to 
the extent that it occurs as ‘unearned’ profit by the company? 
 
In considering this issue, it is useful to distinguish between the State-
owned Electricity Supply Board (ESB) and the rest. The ESB is the 
dominant incumbent, with a proposed allocation over the five year phase 2 
(2008-12) period of 38.5 million tonnes of CO2, which is just over two and 
a half times the allocation to the rest of the utility sector.  
ESB 
The value of the pass through to the ESB is estimated for two scenarios – 
assuming a price of €23 per tonne and pass through of 50 per cent and 
average price of €25 – and pass through of 70 per cent – is shown in 
Table 2.  The total value for the five year second phase is €438-668 million 
range.  
 
 
7‘Opportunity cost’ is the value foregone in using an asset and is independent of whether 
one paid for it or not.  Thus, an allowance in EU ETS for delivery in 2008 is today trading 
at €26.00 per tonne of CO2. If – as will be the case in Ireland – emitters get these valuable 
allowances for free, they will still recognise their full value as they make decisions. Just 
because an indulgent aunt gives you a house for free, you do not give it away or rent it for 
free – you recognise its full opportunity cost.  
8See: All Island Project – the Bidding Code of Practice – A Response and Decision Paper 
AIP-SEM 07-430, 30 July 2007. We are grateful to Neil Walker for alerting us to this 
document.  
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Table 2: Estimated Value of Pass Through of CO2 Price Accruing to the ESB, Two Scenarios, 
2008-12  
     
Operator Name Location Proposed Annual 
Allocation  
(2008-12) 
Million Tonnes 
Value of Price 
Pass Through 
Scenario 19 
Million € 
Value of Pass 
Through 
Scenario 210 
Million € 
1. ESB Moneypoint Powergen 3.735 42.95 65.36 
2. ESB  Poolbeg Powergen 1.536 17.66 26.88 
6 ESB Tarbert Powergen 1.001 11.50 17.50 
14 ESB  Aghada Powergen 0.526 6.05 9.20 
15 ESB Lanesboro Powergen 0.512 5.89 8.96 
17 ESB North Wall Powergen 0.325 3.74 5.69 
Total Annual  7.635 87.79 133.59 
Total 5 years 2008-12  38.175 438.95 667.95 
     
 
Since the ESB is wholly government owned, as a shareholder it should 
in any event benefit from any surplus. However, the policy context is 
rapidly evolving. In July 2008, the Commission on Energy Regulation 
(CER) welcomed the joint announcement by the Spanish utility Endesa and 
the ESB that the former was purchasing a number of ESB power 
generation stations as part of the Commission’s CER-ESB Asset Strategy 
Agreement aimed at reducing ESB’s share of the power generation market 
to 40 per cent by 2010. On March 27, 2008, the ESB and the government 
announced a major investment programme, whereby between now and 
2020, €22 billion will be invested, including networks (€11 billion) that will 
facilitate the development of 6,000 MW of wind power island wide 
development on its own account of 1,400 MW of wind power investment 
in energy efficiency, including smart metering. The ESB proposes to halve 
its carbon emissions within 12 years, delivering one-third of its electricity 
from renewable generation, and achieve carbon net zero by 2035. It seems 
likely that some of this investment will correct for market failures e.g. in 
energy efficiency via smart meters, and that there is a case for allowing all 
of the value of the pass through to be held by the company to help fund 
this investment However, it is important to formalise the analysis to see 
that such is the case. This would also help decide what policy should be in 
relation to the surplus likely to accrue to the other companies.  
Other Utilities 
A similar logic applies to the other utilities. The aggregate surplus accruing 
over 5 years is estimated to fall in the €174-269 million range (Table 3). The 
CER has been struggling to encourage sufficient capacity to provide 
competition to the ESB, so there may be reluctance to impose 
requirements on those new entrants who have come into the market. 
However, this needs to be balanced by the fact that consumers are 
providing them with a gain for which they have not paid, and a quid pro quo 
is appropriate, perhaps with a focus on energy efficiency. The Kema (2008) 
 
9Assuming average price per tonne of CO2 of €23, and – following Sijm et al. (2006) – an 
average pass through of 50 per cent. Example for Moneypoint: Annual pass through 
equals 3.735 million x 23 x 0.5 = 42.95. 
10Assuming average price per tonne of CO2 of €25 and an average pass through of 70 per 
cent. Example for Moneypoint: Annual Pass through equals 3.735 million x 25 x 0.70 = 
65.36. 
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analysis of energy efficiency enhancing opportunities in Ireland makes the 
point (p.30) that : 
 
It is clear that electricity offers the most significant potential for energy savings 
(greater than those of oil and gas combined). This reflects both the nature of 
electricity use in society and also the losses associated with its generation. 
Table 3:  Estimated Value of Pass Through of CO2 Price Accruing to the 
Other (non ESB) Utilities, Two Scenarios, 2008-12  
     
Company Facility Proposed 
Annual 
Allocation 
Million 
Tonnes 
Value of price 
pass through 
Scenario 111 
Million € 
Value of 
Pass 
Through 
Scenario 212 
 
  8 Viridian Power  Huntstown, 
Finglas 
Powergen 0.806 9.27 14.1 
     
  9 Synergen Ringsend 
Powergen 0.768 8.83 13.4 
     
10 Tynagh Energy Tynagh Co 
Galway  
Powergen 0.739 8.5 12.9 
     
11 Huntstown Power 
Co. 
Finglas  
0.721 
 
8.29 
 
12.62 
     
 Total  3.034 34.89 53.1 
     
 Total over 5 years  15.17 174.43 265.5 
     
TRADING POST 2013 
The European Commission has presented proposals for the EU ETS from 
2013 to 2020 (the third phase) and thereafter. The key features are:  
 
• Cap tightening – stepwise reduction of total allowances by 20 per 
cent by 2020.  
 
• Centralisation (’harmonisation’) of – cap fixing, allocation, 
monitoring verification and enforcement.  
 
• Auctioning of allowances, with focus on the power sector. 
 
• Leakage provisions for the non-power sectors – more free 
allowances and/or ‘equivalent effort’ required of imports to EU.  
 
• Banking (including Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from 
CDMs that are already in the second phase ERs) over 13 years – 
2008-2020. 
 
11Assuming average price per tonne of CO2 of €23, and – following Sijm et al. (2006) – an 
average pass through of 50 per cent. Example for Moneypoint: Annual pass through 
equals 3.735 million x 23 x 0.5 = 42.95. 
12Assuming average price per tonne of CO2 of €25 and an average pass through of 70 per 
cent. Example for Moneypoint: Annual Pass through equals 3.735 million x 25 x 0.70 = 
65.36. 
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• CERs post 2012 parked pending UN agreement. 
 
• Exclude small-scale installations (but require “equivalent effort”?). 
 
• Effort sharing – distribute 10 per cent of auctioned allowances to 
poorer Member States. 
 
These measures are to be welcomed for a number of reasons: 
 
Auctioning will remove the advantage which free allocation gives to 
incumbents. It will also generate revenues which will accrue to the member 
states and can be used inter alia to reduce other taxes, intensify carbon 
reduction effort elsewhere and provide support for poorer people who are 
particularly disadvantaged by higher prices.  
 
The long period of banking and borrowing will allow smoothing of the 
market thereby reducing price swings. 
 
Innovation in new carbon reducing technologies will be stimulated by 
the longer time horizon, the more stable prices and the guarantee that there 
will be an immediate cash payoff to reductions.  
 
The ESB’s strategy of investing in carbon reducing technologies will 
have the commercial benefit to them of reducing the volume of allowances 
that they will need to buy to cover their emissions, to the point that they 
may become exporters of allowances.  
COMPETITIVENESS ISSUES 
No significant issue in this regard has arisen during the pilot phase, with 
net outgoings being less than would be paid for an acre of land in Dublin’s 
city centre. 
Short Term (2008-2012) 
There are short-term issues in the second period arising from the free 
allocations. When low carbon competitors come into the Irish market, it is 
crucial that the incumbent advantage of free allocation not be allowed to 
disadvantage such new entrants.  
 
There is a systematic tendency for the non-utility firms to be treated 
generously. Excluding cement, their emissions are small: generally a lot less 
than 100,000 tonnes annually. Those of some significance as regards 
volume are the Conoco Phillips Whitegate Refinery (Relevant Emission of 
372,094; allocation 389,164), Bord na Móna briquette factories at 
Derrinlough (relevant emission 68,343; allocation 71,478) and Littleton 
(relevant emission 67,180; allocation 70,261), Diageo Dublin (relevant 
emission 70,681; allocation 73,924).  
 
Each of the four largest cement installations received 96 per cent of 
their relevant emissions, based on a pro rata allocation of the sectoral 
envelope. If the construction industry grows, and cement holds or grows 
its share, then these firms – CRH and Quinn – will have to buy allowances 
to cover their emissions at the margin. Conversely, if construction declines 
and/or they lose market share, then they could end up with more 
allowances than they need, and be able to sell these in the market place.  
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Longer Term (2013-2020)  
While allowances to the utility sector will be auctioned, the issue of 
auctioning allowances for the non-utility sectors in the scheme is left more 
open, depending in part on the credibility of the evidence regarding 
competitiveness issues. Going forward, the Commission proposes a two 
step approach. Identify the extent to which such issues are relevant at the 
sectoral level. If there is evidence of negative competitive effects, two 
possible solutions – requiring ‘equivalent effort’ from companies selling 
into the EU, in the sense of buying allowances to cover the emissions that 
were emitted, or giving European producers free allowances. These options 
are currently being debated. 
CARBON TAX AND TRADING 
The firms in the trading scheme have shown that they can adapt to the 
market. They are faced with a price signal in the Euro 20-30 range that tells 
them 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, that, if they reduce emissions at a 
cost below this level, they can sell the allowances released at a profit. It 
would be redundant and economically inefficient to apply a carbon tax to 
those in the trading sector, for the following reasons: individuals and firms 
adjust at the margin to approximately make the costs and benefits at the 
margin equal, and diminishing returns sets in – the more you do, the more 
expensive it becomes. Efficiency for a particular objective is maximised if 
the returns at the margin across all the abators is equal. So we recommend 
that the carbon tax only be applied to those not in the trading scheme. The 
scale of the challenge, in terms of meeting the Commission’s target of a 20 
per cent reduction in the non-trading sectors is clear from the Table below. 
Table 4: Emissions from the Non-Trading Sector in 2005, and Hypothetical Targets for 2020 
to Meet the EU Cap  
     
Sector Emissions in 
2005 Million 
Tonnes of CO2 
Equivalent 
Per Cent 
of Total 
Target if Each 
Sector Reduced 
Pro Rata by 20 
Per Cent in 
Tonnes of CO2e 
Reduction 
Needed in 
Million 
Tonnes of 
CO2e 
Agriculture13  19.6 41.3 15.7 -3.9 
     
Transport 13.0 27.4 10.4 -2.6 
     
Residential (non-electric only) 6.9 14.6 5.5 -1.4 
     
Service Premises (private offices and 
public buildings) 2.9 6.1 2.3 -0.6 
     
Waste 1.8 3.8 1.4 -0.4 
     
Other (industry not in EU ETS, tourism 
etc. 3.2 6.8 2.6 -0.6 
     
Total 47.4 100 37.9 -9.5 
     
 
 
 
 
13Most emissions from agriculture and waste are methane. 
  MOBILISING MARKET-BASED INSTRUMENTS FOR CLIMATE CHANGE IN IRELAND 27 
Note that this scenario assumes that emissions in 2020 will equal those 
in 2005, which is a highly conservative assumption.14 But even with this 
context, we have to squeeze almost 10 million tonnes of emissions out of 
the system over 12 years, in a context where emissions from agriculture 
only reduced by 0.7 million tonnes (from 20.3 to 19.6 million) over the 
1993-2005 period, and emissions from transport rose by 7.2 million tonnes 
(from 5.8 to 13.0 million) over the same period.  
 
What role can a carbon tax play in meeting this challenge? This is the 
topic to which we now turn.  
 
 A carbon tax is a tax on the emissions of carbon or carbon dioxide and is 
a favoured instrument for economists to reduce CO2 emissions due to its 
cost-effectiveness. Unlike international oil price rises, which benefit foreign 
producers, the revenues from carbon taxes can enable other taxes to be 
reduced, vulnerable households to be helped and the energy-efficiency of 
their homes to be upgraded.  
4. 
Carbon Tax 
in the Non-
Trading 
Sectors  
As with all market-based instruments the relative increase in the cost of 
emitting carbon coaxes people to adjust their habits to dearer energy. The 
goal is to ultimately reduce carbon emissions by sending a price signal to 
businesses and consumers so that they change their behaviour. By giving 
users the choice to either reduce their emissions or to pay the tax, carbon 
taxes are cost effective since generally firms and users with the least 
abatement costs undertake abatement first. There is also dynamic 
efficiency, as carbon taxes incentivise firms to invest in technological 
innovation that will allow them to continually improve their emissions 
reductions. Inventors of clever ways to reduce energy use now face 
customers whose interest is enhanced by the true value of the savings that 
efficiency will bring them. 
 
Carbon taxes are a price-based instrument, compared with emissions 
trading which is based on emissions quantities.15 There are advantages and 
disadvantages to both in their implementation but theoretically, if 
emissions permits are auctioned in perfect market conditions then both 
instruments can be equivalent. As with all policy, it is the design of policy 
measures which determine their success or failure under the usual criteria 
of static and dynamic economic efficiency, environmental effectiveness, 
socio-economic impacts, and political/public feasibility.  
 
Taxes on income and labour have a tendency to discourage work while 
taxes on pollution discourage pollution. Therefore, raising the same 
amount of revenue but via more pollution taxes and lower labour taxes 
helps make the economy more efficient while lowering pollution. 
Aggregate taxes do not rise but they are raised in a smart manner. Similar 
arguments can be made for emissions trading systems where emissions 
permits are auctioned and the revenue used to reduce other taxes. There 
 
14Recent EPA projections suggest that in 2020 the non-ETS sectors will generate 53.3, 
52.0, and 44.9 Mt CO2 under their baseline, “with measures”, and “with additional 
measures” scenarios respectively. 
15In the cap-and-trade version of ETS, a cap is set on the total emissions permitted from 
the sectors included in the scheme. 
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are now several Member States with Environmental Tax Reform (ETR) in 
place and the COMETR project has carried out an ex-post assessment of 
the experiences of seven EU Member States with ETR and finds that there 
are largely positive effects (see Box 1). 
 
The Programme for Government agreed in July 2007 states that: 
Appropriate fiscal instruments, including a carbon levy, will be phased in 
on a revenue-neutral basis over the lifetime of this Government. The 
environment subgroup of the Commission on Taxation was established in 
March 2008 …to investigate fiscal measures to protect and enhance the 
environment including the introduction of a carbon tax.  
 
A carbon tax has been discussed in the Irish context repeatedly since 
Fitz Gerald and McCoy first explored the options for implementation of a 
carbon tax in Ireland in their seminal paper in 1992. Further work was 
carried out subsequently on the impact of a carbon tax on the Irish 
economy (Bergin et al., 2004; Smith, 2003; Wissema and Dellink, 2007; Fitz 
Gerald et al., 2008; and Tol et al., 2008) and examining the distributive 
effect on households (Scott and Eakins, 2004; Tol et al., 2008). The 
Department of Finance considered the introduction of a carbon tax in 2003 
and opened a public consultation on the issue.16 Subsequently, a report was 
produced summarising the 117 submissions and in September 2004 the 
Minister for Finance, Charlie McCreevy, announced that the carbon tax 
would not be implemented. The reason given was that …the environmental 
benefits would not justify the difficulties that would arise, particularly for households, 
from the introduction of such a tax. There was insufficient political will to 
implement a policy with such a high level of public unpopularity.  
Box 1: Evidence from Other EU Member States 
The COMETR project examined the experience of six countries on the 
issues of competitiveness, carbon leakage, mitigation, and compensation 
with respect to Environmental Tax Reform (ETR). The study concludes 
that while the environmental taxes implemented were “relatively modest”, 
they have contributed to greenhouse gas emissions reduction of between 
1.5 and 6 per cent in 2004 compared to business as usual. It is estimated 
that by 2012 the effect will comprise a reduction of up to 7 per cent below 
the outcome without the tax reform. In addition it is calculated that the tax 
reform has produced a modest but significant positive effect on economic 
growth. This has arisen because carbon taxes have led to energy efficiency 
gains and lower wage costs.  
 
The study found that there are winning and losing sectors under the 
reform and that overall there has been an economic advantage for five of 
the six countries studied. In the UK the reform was found to have a neutral 
effect on the economy, but it was noted that the scale of the tax rates levied 
there has been modest and it is also the most recent environmental tax 
reform. 
 
It appears to make a difference whether energy prices or taxes increase. 
The main reason for this is that with energy price rises the additional 
revenue does not return to the public domain but is exported whereas 
domestic taxes can be used to lower other taxes. In addition, domestic 
 
16http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1778 
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taxes are not levied on non-fuel imported raw materials and intermediate 
goods and this can have implications for firm competitiveness.17  
Figure 1: The Effect* of Green Tax Reform (ETR) on Economic Growth 
 
 
*The effect is measured as the difference between the baseline and the reference case of 
ETR. Slovenia has not introduced green tax reform, but has adjusted energy taxes in the 
industrial sector according to CO2-content. 
Source: Cambridge Econometrics.18 
 
A Commission on Taxation has been re-formed in 2008 with an 
environmental subgroup to examine again the potential introduction of a 
carbon tax and it is interesting to consider how to resolve the perceived 
obstacles from 2003. The following concerns are often raised in arguments 
against a carbon tax: 
 
• Not effective in terms of CO2 emissions reduced – while energy 
prices have risen over the past years, energy consumption has also 
risen; 
 
• Most of industry is already part of the EU ETS and carbon taxation 
would lead to double taxation;  
 
• Reduction in industry competitiveness; 
 
• Issue of fuel poverty among low income households; 
 
• Inequitable burden on rural dwellers due to high price of transport 
fuels. 
 
Carbon taxation is a contentious issue, particularly in a world of high 
energy prices. An important argument in its favour is our high level of 
greenhouse gas emissions and the fact that we have legally binding 
commitments under European Union law which are proving expensive to 
meet. In the last budget the government set aside €270 million in addition 
to the previous €20 million in 2005 in order that the government be able to 
 
17COMETR website http://www.dmu.dk/International/News/Archive/2007/CO2tax. 
htm. The full report is available on the COMETR website http://www2.dmu.dk/ 
cometr/  
18Ibid. 
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purchase up to 18 million tonnes of carbon allowances over the period 
2008-2012. This assumes a purchase price of approximately €15/tCO2 
emissions; if this price rises appreciably or Ireland requires even more 
allowances to meet rising emissions, then the amount required to buy 
credits could become significantly higher. As noted earlier, these 
obligations are expected to become more demanding post 2012. Instead of 
raising general taxes on all taxpayers to buy out our obligations, it makes 
sense to face every emitter with the cost of their emissions, and encourage 
them automatically to reduce. This is fair because those who emit most pay 
most, and it is efficient because the abatement response is left to the 
emitter.  
LEVEL AND TIMING OF THE CARBON TAX 
In the Programme for Government, there is a commitment to reduce 
emissions to 86 per cent of 2007 levels by 2010. Since this commitment 
was agreed, the Commission has proposed that Ireland’s emissions from 
the non-traded sector be reduced by 20 per cent by 2020, perhaps rising to 
30 per cent in the event of international agreement. We propose that this 
Commission target should supercede the programme for government 
commitment for the following reasons: it ensures consistency between Irish 
and EU policy, and it allows more time for government business and 
households to bring forward and implement reduction strategies that are 
cost effective.  
 
When should a tax be introduced, and at what level? Greenhouse gas 
emissions continue to rise in the non-trading sectors and policies are 
needed with immediate effect that begin to arrest this trend and raise 
awareness as soon as possible. Therefore, the carbon tax should be 
implemented forthwith, modified if necessary thereafter to ensure 
consistency with the Commission for Taxation’s proposals. A carbon tax 
could be phased in, starting with the budget for 2009, initially at a low level, 
to give businesses and households time to adjust, rising to approximately 
equal the price of carbon in the emissions trading market so that all sectors 
are equally treated. This is estimated to be about €25/tCO2 in 2012. It takes 
3-5 years for most of the incentive effects of a carbon levy to be reflected 
on the ground and therefore, the tax could be introduced now, even at a 
low level.  
SCOPE OF THE CARBON TAX 
We agree with Tol (2007), Tol et al. (2008) and Fitz Gerald et al. (2008) that 
sectors already included in the ETS should be exempt from the carbon tax. 
The scope of the EU ETS is fixed for now and unlikely to be extended to 
other sectors in the near future. Although most allowances were 
grandfathered to the sectors in the EU ETS, there is evidence to suggest 
that carbon prices will be passed through to consumers and, therefore, as 
discussed in the previous section we do not propose that ETS sectors be 
liable for a carbon tax. It can be expected that the cost to firms in the ETS 
of ‘acquiring’ permits will mean the cost of using permits by emitting CO2 
and these costs will be passed through to consumers even if extra permits 
are not purchased. As noted, it is proposed that allowances in EU ETS be 
auctioned from 2013. While the tax in principle should cover all of the 
non-traded emissions, there would be difficulties in implementing such a 
tax to diffuse non-point sources, such as agriculture. So we propose that 
the tax initially apply to the rest of the non-traded sectors – transport, 
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residential, services, waste industry not in EU ETS – with a separate 
‘equivalent effort’ provisions to apply to agriculture.   
 
Concerns with social equity should be addressed through the use of 
revenue from the tax and we will discuss this in a later section.  
POTENTIAL CO2 EMISSIONS REDUCTIONS 
A study by Kema (2008) for Sustainable Energy Ireland focused on 
opportunities to achieve energy efficiency in the residential, commercial 
and industrial sectors. It identifies substantial economic potential for 
carbon savings in electricity, oil and gas, where ‘economic’ is defined as 
“those measures that are cost effective under current conditions.”19 It does 
not address agriculture and transport, and does not distinguish between the 
traded and the non-traded sectors. Estimates of the costs and potential for 
emissions reduction are also found in ICF Byrne Ó Cléirigh (2006) in their 
analysis of the marginal costs of abatement prepared for the Department of 
the Environment, Heritage and Local Government as background for the 
development of the National Allocation Plans for EU ETS. Their analysis 
does recognise the distinction between trading and non-trading sectors, and 
includes agriculture and transport. Although they are difficult to compare, 
because of the different focus and scope, the ICF Byrne Ó Cléirigh analysis 
seems to be much more conservative as to what can be achieved at what 
cost. An estimate of the impact of a carbon tax of 20€/tCO2 on emissions 
from the non-trading sectors excluding agriculture was included in the 
Comhar SDC submission to Budget 2008. CO2 emissions reductions were 
estimated using long run (3-5 years) elasticities and resulting CO2 
percentage changes for households (-3.1 per cent) and industry (-4.3 per 
cent) from ESRI, road haulage transport using elasticities from Bjørner, 
(1999) (-0.1),20 road transport (cars) (-0.17) from Ryan et al. (2007)21 and it 
is assumed that the elasticity for service premises is equal to that of 
industry. This led to estimated savings of 469kt CO2 emissions based on 
2005 values, which is similar to the 500kt estimated in the Department of 
Finance consultation document produced in 2003. 
 
 
The literature in this area has examined the impact of different carbon 
price levels on Irish CO2 emissions. Bergin et al. (2004) found that a carbon 
tax of €20/tCO2 emissions would not reduce emissions sufficiently to meet 
Ireland’s target in 2012 of 13 per cent emissions increase compared with 
1990 under the EU burden-sharing agreement. However, Wissema and 
Dellink (2007) find that a carbon tax of approximately €10-15/tCO2 would 
result in a reduction of 25.8 per cent compared with 1998 levels, which 
would achieve Ireland’s 2012 target. More recently FitzGerald et al. (2008) 
and Tol et al. (2008) find that a carbon tax set approximately equal to the 
emissions trading price, i.e. €20/tCO2 in 2012 and €38/tCO2 in 2020 would 
reduce CO2 emissions from the non-ETS sectors by a modest amount 
19Amounting to 3.759, 1.868 and 0.714 million tonnes of CO2 respectively.  
20Bjørner, T.B. (1999). “Environmental Benefits from Better Freight Transport 
Management: Freight Traffic in a VAR Model,” Transportation Research D, Vol. 4, No. 1, 
January,  pp. 45-64. 
21Ryan, L., S. Ferreira, and F. Convery (2007). “The impact of fiscal and other measures 
on new passenger car sales and CO2 emissions intensity: Evidence from Europe”, ongoing 
research. 
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(523kt) and would not achieve the proposed 2020 CO2 emissions target. 
However, these are in part a function of the use to which the carbon tax 
revenue is put, which is the subject of the next section. 
 
The announcement of the introduction of a carbon tax has an important 
impact on reducing carbon emissions in advance of the actual 
implementation of such a scheme. In the UK, study of the impact of the 
climate change levy (CCL) shows that there is a much stronger 
“announcement effect” than “price effect” on emissions reductions.22 They 
estimate that the announcement effect of the CCL on its own (i.e. without 
price effects from the imposition of the CCL) caused a reduction in energy 
demand from other final users of 4.0 per cent in 2001, then 8.4 per cent in 
2002, and this is expected to rise to 13.8 per cent in 2010. This includes the 
feedback effect of lower demand causing lower electricity prices, which 
reduced the announcement effect’s impact. The modelling work described 
above regarding an Irish carbon tax does not include any additional effects 
such as the “announcement” effect and therefore, it may be that the 
introduction of a carbon tax in Ireland would have a stronger impact on 
CO2 emissions than the models have indicated. 
Box 2: UK Climate Change Levy and Agreements 
In the UK a climate change levy was announced in 1999 and implemented 
in 2001. We have examined this levy for comparison with a potential 
carbon tax in Ireland. First, there is a fundamental difference in that the 
UK climate change levy is only applied to industry, commerce and the 
public sector. It does not apply to fuels used by the domestic or transport 
sector, fuels used for the production of other forms of energy (e.g. 
electricity generation) or for non-energy purposes; it also does not apply to 
energy used by registered charities for non-business uses, and energy used 
by very small firms.23 The levy is not charged as a function of the carbon 
content of fuels but is levied directly on the energy type. Businesses that are 
part of the climate change negotiated agreements and who meet their 
energy reduction targets are eligible for an 80 per cent rebate in the climate 
change levy. Businesses that are part of the negotiated climate change 
agreements are also eligible to join the emissions trading scheme to buy 
allowances beyond their target. In this way firms either meet their 
agreement target through their abatement efforts or by purchase of 
emissions allowances and pay 20 per cent of the climate change levy, or 
they do not and pay the tax. 
 
 
 
 
22Cambridge Econometrics (2005). “Modelling the initial effects of the climate change levy”. 
Available at http://customs.hmrc.gov.uk/channelsPortalWebApp/channelsPortalWebApp 
.portal?_nfpb=true&_pageLabel=pageImport_ShowContent&propertyType=document&
columns=1&id=HMCE_PROD1_023971#P15_3004 [Accessed 8/10/2007]  
23Rates of levy are 0.15p/kWh for gas, 0.98/kg (equivalent to 0.07p/kWh) for liquefied 
petroleum gas (LPG),  0.44/kWh for electricity and, 0.12p for any other taxable 
commodity. The levy is expected to raise around £1 billion in its first full year (2001/02). 
The levy package is expected to lead to reductions in carbon dioxide emissions of at least 
2.5 million tonnes of carbon a year by 2010.  
http://www.defra.gov.uk/environment/climatechange/uk/business/ccl/intro.htm 
[accessed October 8, 2007]. 
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REVENUE USE 
The Medium-Term Review estimates the CO2 emissions from the non-traded 
sector in 2010 to be approximately 28 MtCO2.24 This equates to a revenue 
stream of around €550 million (for a carbon tax of €20/tCO2) and is 
forecast to grow annually by between 7.2 per cent and 8.2 per cent, 
depending on whether all greenhouse gas emissions are included or just 
CO2 emissions and whether ETS permits are auctioned. Therefore, the 
revenue from a carbon tax is expected to be significant and there are 
several options for its use. The Programme for Government states that the 
carbon levy or tax should be revenue neutral which means that the 
revenues from the levy should be recycled back to the citizens – taxes 
should not be increased but rather the tax base shifted in favour of carbon 
emission reducing activities, or the money should be returned. How exactly 
this is done is a key determinant of (a) environmental performance, (b) 
economic competitiveness, and (c) public acceptability. The latter is 
becoming increasingly important in the face of rising energy prices. There 
are three broad categories of use for carbon tax revenue generally discussed 
– hypothecation for investment in environmental activities, 
macroeconomic adjustment such as a reduction in labour taxes, and finally, 
compensation to households for distributive effects. 
 
The first option is to recycle some or all of the revenues from the 
carbon tax to the different sectors in approximate proportion to their 
payments, and in manners that further intensifies and incentivises actions 
to reduce emissions and to address some of the equity and competitiveness 
concerns associated with a carbon tax. In general, economists prefer that 
the revenue from environmental taxes not be set aside or hypothecated for 
greenhouse gas emissions saving activities. The argument is mainly that it 
reduces the flexibility of the government budget and also that if an activity 
is not worth subsidising from the national budget then it is also not worth 
subsidising with the carbon tax revenue (Tol et al., 2008). The latter point 
assumes that government already has in place a system for the efficient 
allocation of public expenditure. There is the risk that if significant funds 
are earmarked for investment in specific activities then they may be 
wastefully spent in order to “use up” the funds.  
 
However, there are some advantages associated with a decision that 
some of the carbon tax revenue should be invested in further greenhouse 
gas emissions savings activities. The experience of Sustainable Energy 
Ireland through the pilot negotiated agreements programme with industry 
in 2002 showed that the emissions savings were almost doubled if a carbon 
tax was linked with an industry agreement providing energy-saving 
expertise and services. There is a case to be made that there may currently 
be underinvestment of the government budget in public good activities 
such as energy technology R&D, centres providing expertise and advice to 
firms in energy efficiency and other greenhouse gas emissions mitigation 
and adaptation activities, which are of little commercial value at this time. 
In addition, investment in developing alternative energy sources such as 
renewable energies may reduce the burden of the carbon levy in the long 
run.  
 
24Note that the emissions forecast is calculated including a carbon tax and, therefore, the 
emissions have been adjusted to take this into account. 
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Another significant advantage of investment of the revenue in the 
sectors that have paid the taxes is that it is likely to increase the public 
acceptability and hence, political feasibility of implementing a carbon tax. 
There is also a fairness aspect; if all the revenue is spent on individuals’ 
income tax reductions and welfare benefits, then it might be argued that 
business sectors facing the carbon tax such as road haulage, services sectors 
etc. also deserve a share of the revenue directly.25  
 
There may be a case for using some of the revenue to increase 
stakeholder buy-in to a carbon tax scheme and also to maximise the 
greenhouse gas emissions savings that could be achieved through 
investment in public good activities such as provision of centres of 
expertise etc. In order to identify the best means to utilise the revenue in 
each sector, the government could engage with each sector to identify 
expenditure within the sector that will further reduce emissions. This is 
consistent with the partnership model that has worked well for Ireland, and 
should encourage ‘buy in’ as well as increasing the effect on emissions 
reduction yielded by the incentive effects of the levy alone. The key 
requirement of any sectoral agreement would be that it significantly and 
cost-effectively further reduces emissions. While we do not argue that all 
carbon tax revenue should be spent on investment in climate change-
related activities, we believe that more government spending is needed in 
certain public good activities relating to climate change and that a portion 
of the carbon tax revenue could be used to fund this. Further study is 
needed to examine the gaps in current spending and to assess the amounts 
needed to develop opportunities and technologies to reduce greenhouse 
gas emissions cost effectively. Regular review would be needed of the 
amounts spent to ensure efficiency. The Kema (2008) and ICF Byrne Ó 
Cléirigh (2006) analyses provide contrasting menus of opportunities which 
need to be investigated further to identify (a) the hierarchy of reduction 
opportunities that exist, ranked on the basis of cost effectiveness, (b) the 
government or market failures that are inhibiting the take up of these 
opportunities and (c) the role, if any, of public expenditure in facilitating 
abatement.   
 
Another option is to use the funds to reduce other taxes and charges, 
e.g. PRSI, or to provide a lump sum rebate to households. Classical ETR 
protagonists favour the use of environmental tax revenue to lower other 
taxes such as on labour. Since carbon tax raises prices and therefore the 
cost of living too, it would normally be expected that wage demands would 
also rise. Therefore the revenue from carbon tax could be used to offset 
some of the increased costs people face by for example reducing income 
taxes, social insurance contributions, or giving a lump sum to all 
households. This could be done in line with the Agreed Programme for 
Government, which has the stated goal of reducing PRSI at 2 per cent to 4 
per cent over the term of government. However, the programme also plans 
to raise the ceiling on PRSI rates so that PRSI can be levied on all income 
in which case the additional revenue raised would cover the reduction in 
rates. Wages on the other hand have risen in Ireland significantly over the 
last years with 5.5 per cent growth in 2007 and exceed that of many of our 
trading partners. While the Spring ESRI Quarterly Economic Commentary 
 
25Although they would benefit indirectly through stable wage demands as a result of the 
income tax reduction. 
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forecasts this to decrease over 2008 and 2009 to 4 per cent and 3.5 per cent 
respectively (Barrett et al. 2008), the use of carbon tax revenue to reduce 
labour costs further could be significant in improving Ireland’s 
competitiveness.    
 
The Medium-Term Review and Tol et al. (2008) model the effect of 
different uses of revenue on the economy and CO2 emissions. They 
compare the impact of using carbon tax revenue to invest in health and 
education, reductions in income tax, social insurance or national debt, 
distribute lump sums to householders, and buy permits internationally. 
They find that investment in health and education has the largest positive 
effect on GNP and employment but that in the long run causes a reduction 
in the output of the private sector due to crowding out by the public sector. 
A reduction in income tax is beneficial to the economy and employment, 
however, only those who have a taxed income are included and therefore, 
other mechanisms such as increased welfare benefits would also need to be 
included for those not in the tax net.  
 
Scott and Eakins (2004) and Tol et al. (2008) examine the impact of a 
carbon tax on household income and find that it is regressive as expected,26 
the lower income deciles of the population spend a higher share of their 
incomes on fuels. Scott and Eakins (2004) considered various forms of 
compensation27 to lower income households and found that a strategy 
which delivers lump sum compensation to the bottom five income deciles 
of the order of the average annual expenditure on carbon tax (estimated at 
€246) would be best. They also recommend setting aside approximately €50 
million for energy efficiency enhancing schemes such as house insulation 
and fuel switching. There were an estimated 100,000 households or 6.5 per 
cent of the population in 2005, who went “without heating at some stage 
during the year” because they could not afford it.28 It costs on average 
€1,000 to install attic or wall cavity insulation in a home (which improves 
energy efficiency by 20 per cent); therefore, a significant budget is required 
to perform this task in all homes classified as at risk of fuel poverty. 
 
The modelling work by Fitz Gerald et al. (2008) and Tol et al. (2008) 
estimates that the increased cost of living due to the carbon tax could be 
fully compensated by reducing labour taxes and increased welfare benefits 
with 65-80 per cent of the revenue, leaving 20-35 per cent of the revenue 
available for other uses. From this it seems that there is scope to make 
room for use of the revenue for both macroeconomic and greenhouse gas 
emissions mitigation benefits. In line with the literature discussed here, we 
propose that 40 per cent of carbon revenues be utilised to reduce income 
taxes, 25-30 per cent be used to compensate lower income households, and 
the remaining amount be invested in public good activities to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions in the affected sectors.  
 
26Interestingly, Scott and Eakins find that while a carbon tax would be regressive for 
expenditure on residential fuels, expenditure on transport fuels as a share of disposable 
income is highest for middle income families and, therefore, may need some form of 
compensation for the increased costs. 
27In particular they investigated VAT reduction and different strategies of lump sum 
compensation. 
28CSO (2006). EU Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) 2005. 
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CAP AND SHARE SCHEME 
An alternative to a carbon levy has been proposed in some quarters as a 
‘Cap and Share’ scheme (c&s) for some or all of the non-trading sectors, 
whereby each citizen would be given an allowance allocation, with the total 
of such allocations amounting to the desired cap.29. Essentially, the scheme 
would operate similarly to a carbon levy but would address the problem of 
public acceptability since the cap is placed on upstream emissions. There is 
a significant difference between the carbon levy and a cap and share 
scheme in terms of the revenue use. Whereas a carbon levy would generate 
revenue to the Exchequer, a cap and share scheme effectively awards each 
citizen the revenue associated with average per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions. Comhar SDC commissioned research in 2007 on c&s as a policy 
instrument to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from Irish residential and 
transport sectors which are not covered by the EU emissions trading 
scheme. Both represent a significant source of greenhouse gas emissions in 
Ireland, making up 10.7 per cent and 19.4 per cent respectively of Irish 
greenhouse gas emissions in 2006.30 At the time of writing AEA 
Technology have completed a qualitative analysis of the scheme and this 
section is based on that work; further modelling analysis is ongoing with 
Cambridge Econometrics.31   
 
Cap and share is an idea proposed in Ireland by the Foundation for the 
Economics of Sustainability (FEASTA) which is based on the argument 
that each individual should get an equal share of the benefits from the 
limited amount of fossil fuels that will be burned and the associated 
greenhouse gas emissions released to the atmosphere.32 Accordingly, a cap 
would be set for the greenhouse gas emissions emitted by primary fossil 
fuel suppliers to the sectors included in the scheme and certificates issued 
to all adults entitling them to an equal share of the emissions permitted 
under that year’s cap. These certificates could then be sold to the fossil fuel 
suppliers via an intermediary such as a bank or post office. By capping 
emissions upstream the price of emissions is built into the price of fossil 
fuels which are passed through to the consumer. The consumer has an 
incentive to use less fossil fuel than the average amount for which he is 
compensated through the sale of the certificates. There are no examples in 
other countries of such a scheme in operation.  
 
A simple example may better illustrate how this scheme works. The 
government decides the level of a cap on emissions from fuels supplied to 
the household and transport sectors. This amount of emissions is divided 
 
29FEASTA report, 2006. Using Cap and Share to control emissions from the EU transport sector. 
Available at http://www.feasta.org/documents/energy/Transport_emissions_in_EU_ 
proposal2.pdf. More information at www.capandshare.org 
30EPA (2008). “Ireland’s Emissions of Greenhouse Gases for the period 1990-2006”. 
Available at http://www.epa.ie/downloads/pubs/air/airemissions/name,23960,en.html 
31The qualitative analysis is available in the interim report at http://www.comharsdc.ie/ 
publications/index.aspx  
32Progress of the cap-and-share idea can be traced through various papers published by 
FEASTA on their website. Contraction and Convergence was the original concept and 
Richard Douthwaite worked with Aubrey Meyer over 12 years up to about 2005 
developing it and also producing a Schumacher Briefing on it. 
http://greenbooks.co.uk/store/product_info.php?cPath=33&ref=159&products_id=184
&osCsid=7b2ef78582fa1fe15fdaa88cc3689cfe 
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equally between all citizens and each citizen is sent a certificate representing 
credits for the average amount of CO2 emissions. Fuel importers now 
come under the emissions cap upstream and are required to buy emissions 
credits from banks; they then pass-through the cost to consumers. The 
consumers, facing this extra cost, bring their certificates to the 
intermediary, maybe a bank, and cash in the whole amount or perhaps just 
enough to cover their current expenditure while withholding the rest in the 
belief that prices may rise in the future. They are encouraged to reduce 
their CO2 emissions to minimise their exposure to the increased fuel costs.  
DESIGN ISSUES 
Scope 
The Cap and Share scheme could in principle apply to the whole economy 
as a means of driving down emissions in all sectors. However, in practice 
there would be interactions with existing measures and it may be desirable 
to focus on certain emitting sectors.   
 
Emissions from the transport sector represent the largest growing 
source of CO2 emissions and this suggests that the focus of a Cap and 
Share scheme could be emissions from the transport sector. The benefits 
of restricting the scheme to the transport sector would be a focused move 
towards a more sustainable transport system, and provide the opportunity 
for learning before any further expansion. The advantages of wider initial 
implementation would be economies of scale and the opportunity to 
understand more about the interaction between the scheme and the wider 
economy. A second further area of potential coverage is domestic use of 
energy, although the EU ETS does already regulate emissions from the 
electricity sector. 
Equity 
There are winners and losers with all price-based carbon emissions 
schemes. With the Cap and Share scheme these effects would be no more 
significant than any other mechanism that places a cost on carbon 
emissions and again it is the design of the scheme that will determine the 
extent of the effects. The effects in general are similar to those described 
above for a carbon tax combined with lump sum compensation for all 
citizens. Under c&s lower income households, on average, would benefit 
since they have lower than average energy consumption and would receive 
emissions certificates worth more than the increased fuel costs they incur.  
However, due to variability within income bands, some low income 
households would be worse off, and may be less able to find energy savings 
or absorb increased costs compared with their wealthier counterparts. 
 
Those living in rural communities could also be disadvantaged, relative 
to those in towns and cities, because they are likely to need to travel greater 
distances for basic amenities. They would also have less access to low 
carbon public transport alternatives to using a car. Also, the distribution of 
certificates to single-person households may not fully compensate them for 
the increased costs they would incur. 
 
There are a number of possible ways to address these equity concerns. 
The preferred approach would be to address them through alternative 
measures, such as increases in the Children’s Allowance, the domestic 
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heating allowance or funding for public transport. These measures could be 
funded through general taxation or through the auction of a proportion of 
the emissions allowances. If the national budget were used this would 
decouple the revenue through carbon emissions from investments in 
environmental activities, as recommended for the carbon tax above. 
However, in this case extra revenue may be required and, therefore, general 
taxes may have to be raised. Reducing each individual’s allocation for the 
purpose of auctioning could be seen to worsen the issue as lower income 
groups would be compensated less than before. A further possibility would 
be to allocate more to those who would otherwise stand to lose, although 
this would appear to undermine the principle of the scheme. 
Population Coverage 
A register of eligible individuals could be complied through a combination 
of the electoral roll and the Personal Public Service number system, to 
capture the majority of people residing in Ireland.  
 
A question on the treatment of children arises, since they are consumers 
of energy but not necessarily purchasers. Literature regarding personal 
trading schemes generally suggests not allocating allowances to children, 
although consideration would need to be given to the age at which 
individuals are treated as an adult for the purpose of the scheme.  
Consideration should also be given to other mechanisms to support 
families regarding the increased carbon costs. Less favoured alternatives 
would include partial allocation to children or allocation on a household 
basis (Starkey and Anderson (2005), Dresner and Ekins (2004), DEFRA 
(2006)). 
 
Short stay visitors would not be included in the scheme, although longer 
stay residents that register for a PPS number should be included. If this 
were the case then consideration of eligibility or something similar would 
be needed in order to avoid exploitation of the scheme by visitors who 
receive and sell certificates and then leave.   
Institutional Arrangements 
A Government body would need to be responsible for setting the 
framework, the objectives and dealing with any policy issues. The 
Department of Environment, Heritage and Local Government, as the 
department responsible for climate policy, would be the most likely choice. 
Cap setting could either be carried out by Government or an independent 
body. In either case, however, the cap should be consistent with the 
national target in the National Climate Change Strategy and the strategy it 
sets for individual sectors. 
 
The scheme would need to be run by a single administrative body. This 
would ensure consistent accountability for all aspects and clarity from the 
perspective of participants. It would also ensure the effects of any changes 
to approach could be managed throughout the process. The 
Environmental Protection Agency, as scheme administrator for the EU 
ETS, would be the logical choice. It could also draw on its experience from 
being responsible for the National Emissions Inventory. The 
responsibilities of this body would be to: maintain the register of fuel 
suppliers; define the standards by which emissions must be reported and 
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verified and produce guidance documents; and maintain the trading 
registry. 
 
In addition to the above activities there would be a number of other 
functions for which the scheme administrator must maintain an overview 
but which may be carried out by other bodies. These would include: 
maintaining a list of participating individuals and issuing them with 
certificates (for which the Department of Social and Family Affairs would 
have a role); determination and verification/audit of emissions (for which 
Customs and Excise would have a role); market regulation and; training 
and capacity building. 
Transaction Costs 
The costs of designing the Cap and Share scheme in relation to other 
measures would in general be higher than introducing a carbon tax. For the 
Cap and Share scheme the cost of administering the fuel suppliers is likely 
to be secondary to the costs associated with issuing certificates to the 
general public. 
 
The cost to the members of the public is very sensitive to a number of 
design issues. The simple bottom up estimate of AEA Technology, which 
included the value of people’s time, puts the transaction costs for a system 
where certificates are cashed in remotely in the range 8-11 per cent of the 
value of the certificates. This range depends on income and assumes an 
allowance price of €20/tCO2 and a bank direct transaction charge of 5 per 
cent. At higher carbon prices the relative cost effectiveness would be 
better, with transaction costs around 6-7 per cent for a price of €50/tCO2.  
However, if participants were required to cash in allowances in person then 
the costs could be significantly higher. To minimise transaction costs for 
individuals to a level that will be considered acceptable consideration would 
need to be given to the following: 
 
• Allowing on-line and postal facilities for converting certificates. 
 
• Minimising the amount of material that an individual must 
understand, possibly making use of passive media such as television 
and radio broadcasts. 
 
• Allowing individuals to delegate the authority to cash in allowances. 
 
• Simplifying the requirements on banks and post offices to minimise 
their costs and the changes that they may charge for transactions. 
 
• Considering the cost impacts when deciding whether to distribute 
certificates more frequently than yearly. 
 
Finally, the administration costs to those industries that would be 
required to register, trade and surrender allowances would be small in 
comparison with the costs to Government and the general population as a 
whole. 
Legal Aspects 
On legal aspects the European Commission is unlikely to prohibit the 
scheme on the basis of it constituting State aid, primarily because the 
scheme as a whole would not give rise to a net benefit to any commercial 
40 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2009 
undertakings. However, cases that may have relevance to Cap and Share 
where State aid has been upheld have been identified in the AEA 
Technology report. Therefore, it was not possible to be fully conclusive on 
this issue. Similarly, internal market rules should not be prohibitive. 
CAP AND SHARE CONCLUSIONS 
Overall, this research has outlined a number of key design issues relating to 
the Cap and Share scheme, and suggested possible ways forward. In 
particular: 
 
• A cautious approach would suggest initial implementation for the 
transport sector only, with subsequent consideration to sectoral and 
geographical expansion. 
 
• But note that the cap and share approach involves transferring the 
value of allowances directly to the citizenry, i.e. compared to the 
carbon levy, no revenue accrues directly to the Exchequer. 
 
• The scheme is not inherently inequitable, but measures would be 
needed to shield the vulnerable from increased costs.   
 
• The scheme should be based on the PPS system and electoral role, 
with consideration given to the treatment of children. Evidence 
suggests not allocating to children, although again consideration 
will be needed for increasing support to families. 
 
• The roles of various institutions have been suggested, with a key 
element being the scheme administrator that would have an 
overview of the whole scheme.   
 
• Transaction costs to individuals can be acceptably low, provided 
they can cash in their certificates remotely (on-line or by post).  
 
  We are facing a carbon constrained world, where our ability to use the 
atmosphere to dispose of greenhouse gas emissions in limitless quantities 
for free no longer applies. ‘Do nothing’, or ‘let the others do it’ is not 
available as an option. In practical terms, the constraints we face come to 
us from our share of the European Union’s commitments, and these come 
in two forms: the power sector and heavy industry (cement, refining, glass 
and ceramics etc.) which are already in the European Union Emissions 
Trading Scheme (EU ETS), and the rest – the non-traded sectors – 
comprising agriculture, industry not in EU ETS (heating and process 
energy only), households (heating only), transport, commerce, waste. 
5. 
Discussion 
and 
Conclusions 
  
As regards the trading sectors, the evidence we have from the pilot 
phase is that Irish participants in the EU ETS have managed their 
obligations with considerable skill, and they are likely to continue to do so. 
Since they already face a carbon price, we recommend no further policy 
intervention, and we conclude that it would be inefficient and 
counterproductive to include them in a taxation scheme. For the period 
2008-12, the utilities will capture an ‘unearned’ gain, as they will be able to 
pass through most of the value of allowances for which they have not paid. 
We support the pass through, but the fiscal issue arises – should a windfall 
gain tax be imposed to capture some of this gain over the 2008-12 period? 
We propose that such a tax not be imposed, but only on condition that the 
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utilities demonstrate that they are undertaking activities that are in the 
wider public interest, such as funding the installation of time of day meters. 
The definition of ‘the ESB’ is changing as the organisation divests itself of 
generating capacity to meet the regulator’s requirements. The company has 
announced a major investment programme focused on grid development, 
renewable and efficiency measures. The specific payoffs to the public 
interest need to be documented, and related to the subsidy implicit in the 
pass through. The same principle should apply to the other utilities. The 
Commission proposals for the 2013-2020 period are to auction allowances, 
at least for the power sector, with the revenues accruing to the government; 
we support this proposal. 
 
As regards the non-trading sectors, the European Commission has 
proposed a legally binding cap on emissions of minus 20 per cent by 2020 
compared with 2005 emissions. The challenge we face in Ireland is how 
best to meet these targets at minimum cost, and in fashions that encourage 
new business and innovation, and that are fair. Additionally, energy prices 
are very high with uncertainty regarding future prices and this already 
provides an incentive to reduce our energy consumption. We strongly 
favour the use of market based approaches, which allow maximum 
flexibility which in turn will minimise costs and will also allow encourage 
innovation. They also make use of other policies such as regulation of 
building standards, and information on the environmental performance of 
cars and buildings, to operate more effectively.   
   
Using command and control regulation to meet this very stringent target 
would likely be extremely demanding as regards administration and 
bureaucracy, and very inefficient as regards the burden on the economy 
because of loss of flexibility. So we are left with the need to introduce a 
price that signals scarcity but allows a flexible response. There are two 
broad options: apply a carbon levy that incentives reduction, or create a 
trading market that caps emissions, and allows participants to buy and sell. 
The advantages of the levy are as follows: it is easy to implement, with 
minimal transactions costs; it generates revenues that are then available for 
re-cycling for some combination of reduction in other taxes, supporting 
further reductions, and helping vulnerable groups adjust to the price 
changes – the annual revenues of applying a levy at roughly the rate that 
reflects the price of allowances would amount to about €0.5 billion 
annually; it has been done in other countries, so we have experience to 
draw on as regards reduction responses and economic impacts. 
Disadvantages are that particularly in a world of high energy prices it 
evokes public and sectoral opposition, the mitigation of which may require 
‘side payments’ in terms of revenue recycling, and uncertainty as regards 
emissions reductions.  
 
As regards creating a local trading market in what is now the non-
trading sectors, we are at present exploring the potential for a cap and share 
scheme, whereby a cap is decided upon, individual citizens are given 
allowances where the sum of such allocations does not exceed the cap. Up-
stream suppliers of energy will have to buy allowances from the citizenry to 
cover their emissions, and these costs will be factored into the price of their 
energy supplies. This price will increase to the point where demand and 
supply are in equilibrium. The advantages of this scheme are that: it gives 
each citizen an asset which has value in the market place, and establishes an 
identity between the citizen and meeting the climate change challenge, and 
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compensates him or her for the rise in fuel prices – to the extent that one 
can control emissions, either a net profit (value of allowances exceeds rise 
in fuel bill) or loss is incurred; it ensures that the target is met. It is very 
difficult to quantify this sense of ownership and identity, but it is likely to 
be important in mobilising public understanding of the climate change 
issue, and support for measures to address it. The disadvantages are that: 
the transactions costs of setting up and operating the scheme are 
considerable, because it is new and so there is uncertainty as to how it 
would work in practice; it does not generate revenues for government, and 
the inevitable demands for ‘special case’ compensations would have to be 
funded out of general taxation. If the cap and share scheme were to be 
used, it seems that it would be most appropriate in the transport sector, 
where constraining emissions is especially difficult.   
 
Our recommendations are that the carbon tax be phased in immediately 
for the non-trading sectors exclusive of agriculture at rates approximately 
comparable to the price of allowances faced in the trading sector, with 
revenues used to support a national programme of fuel poverty reduction, 
to support further reductions in emissions where it is clear that (a) the 
benefits of doing so exceeds the costs and (b) the market on its own will 
fail to achieve such reductions, and to fund research and development and 
innovation that enhances business opportunities in energy efficiency, 
abatement and adaptation. There is some confusion in the evidence 
available as regards the energy efficiency and abatement opportunities and 
their cost in Ireland. These need further interrogation and updating so as to 
ensure that policy and funding can be directed towards the least cost mix of 
strategies.  
 
If, as seems to be the case, that the marginal costs of abatement in the 
non-trading sectors are much higher than that which prevails in the trading 
sectors, this asymmetry will impose an economic drag on the economy – 
we will end up spending more resources than necessary to achieve any 
given overall combined reductions from the trading and non-trading 
sectors. This is a weakness of the dichotomy between trading and non-
trading in EU climate change policy. Achieving some flexibility between the 
two pillars – doing more in the trading sectors, and less in the others – 
would enhance cost effectiveness and competitiveness.   
 
 If the research underway indicates a clear advantage to cap and share in 
the transport area, the levy on this sector should be removed and replaced 
by the cap and share mechanism. We note that agriculture, which accounts 
for almost half of the non-trading sector emissions, will not be included in 
either scheme at present, as its main emission is methane from livestock. A 
separate parallel abatement strategy is needed for this sector.   
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ANNEX A: TRADING 
AND THE EUROPEAN 
UNION EMISSIONS 
TRADING SCHEME 
The European Union has pioneered the development and implementation 
of the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the world’s 
first trans-national greenhouse gas trading scheme.33 The EU ETS gives a 
price signal that penalises increased emissions and rewards reductions for 
those sectors and organisations in the scheme. 
 
The EU ETS involves making allocations of tonnes of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions (called European Union Allowances or EUAs) per year to 
installations, with the proviso that at the end of the year, they must ‘hold’ 
sufficient allowances to cover their emissions in this period. In order to meet 
this condition, if they are short of allowances, they can enter the market and 
buy from others who have more than they need (‘long’). A price per tonne 
of CO2 emerges from these trades, which represents in some sense a cost to 
emitters of the scarce capacity of the atmosphere to absorb this greenhouse 
gas. If they can reduce emissions, they can sell those allowances that are 
surplus to requirements into the market; if they are short, they have to buy 
in order to cover their requirements. This price signal, therefore, constitutes 
a continuing incentive: reduce and you will be rewarded, increase and you 
will have to pay. The EU ETS is sometimes critiqued because it is not ‘as 
good as’ a carbon tax, and/or that particular design features are perverse and 
inappropriate. In the context below, we show that a tax is not politically 
feasible, and the design features of EU ETS in the short run are a product in 
part of the political necessity, where the choices come down to achieving an 
imperfect carbon price signal versus none at all.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
33Details available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission.htm. See 
discussion on characteristics and performance in: Frank J. Convery and Luke Redmond  
“Market and Price Developments in the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme,” 
Review of Environmental Economics Policy 2007, Vol. 1, No. 1,  pp. 88-111. 
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 The context of this development is the following34: Following the Rio 
Environment and Development Conference in 2002, at which the European 
Commission had pressed for quantitative caps on greenhouse gas emissions, 
it brought forward a proposal for a European Union (EU) wide carbon 
energy tax. This was universally opposed by the various industry lobbies, 
epitomised by UNICE, the European Employers Federation with which the 
Irish Business and Employers Confederation (IBEC) and their equivalents in 
the other member states are affiliated. A number of member states also 
opposed the tax on principle. Since fiscal measures require unanimity, the 
initiative failed, and was formally withdrawn in 1997. There may be 
circumstances under which an EU-wide tax would be politically feasible, but 
it is difficult for us to imagine this as a realistic policy choice.   
A1. 
Context 
 
At the negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol in 1997, the US delegation 
insisted on including emissions trading as a flexible measure, and prevailed 
in spite of strong opposition from the European Union. In 1998, the 
Commission had a change of heart; the team which had failed to secure the 
carbon tax was now given a lead role in the development of climate change 
policy, and charged with progressing an EU-wide emissions trading scheme. 
Commission support was achieved in part because of the Single market and 
associated competitiveness concerns; the UK and Denmark had initiated 
their own (quite different) national trading schemes, and there was a fear 
that the environmental market would be balkanised, with many trading 
schemes with different rules, and associated potential for inhibition of trade 
and high transactions costs. Also, over time, it became clear that ‘business as 
usual’ would probably not achieve the Kyoto target (EEA, 2002), and there 
was no other Europe-wide policy measure that was likely to deliver a change 
in the emissions trajectory.  
 
However, the EU ETS concept was initially vigorously opposed by 
Germany industry and government on the basis that they had already a 
voluntary agreement and did not need another policy layer dictated by the 
Union. Some business elsewhere in Europe was in favour, but argued for a 
voluntary scheme. Unlike the carbon tax proposals, the EU ETS was 
proposed as an environmental measure, and, therefore, only required a 
qualified majority vote by the Member States to secure legal approval. 
However, there was reluctance to proceed without a degree of German 
support, since they emit about 25 per cent of covered emissions. The 
compromise was to agree, but only on the basis that allowances were 
allocated for free at member state level, with guidance and final approval 
from the Commission, with monitoring, reporting and verification also at 
member state level, and with provision to allow ‘opt out’ with equivalent 
effort in the pilot phase and pooling in the pilot and second (2008-12) 
phases, with both of these features included to meet needs in the UK and 
Germany. What emerged was not what should be, but what could be. 
Importantly, a 3 year pilot phase with review was part of the design, so that 
substantive weaknesses could be identified and corrected on a ‘learning by 
doing’ basis. 
 
 
 
34The contextual material that follows is drawn from Skjaerseth and Wettestad (2008).  
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 The operation of EU ETS in its pilot phase has recently been assessed in 
Ellerman and Joskow (2008) and Convery, De Perthuis and Ellerman (2008). 
What follows draws from these sources.  
A2. 
Operation 
 
 The EU ETS35 started its first phase – the three-year pilot phase – in 
January 2005 and this came to an end in December 2007. We can address 
coverage, trading, allowance prices, and abatement in the pilot phase. 
 
Coverage: Participation was limited to CO2 emissions from combustion 
installations with a rated thermal input in excess of 20 MW (except 
municipal or hazardous waste incinerators); oil refineries; production and 
processing of ferrous metals; manufacture of cement (capacity of over 500 
tonnes per day); manufacture of lime (capacity of over 50 tonnes per day); 
ceramics, including brick and glass; and pulp, paper and board (over 20 
tonnes per day). On this basis, EU ETS covered over 40 per cent of 
greenhouse gas emissions in the Union. Why did the coverage go ‘down 
stream’? It is notable that the European scheme does not include road 
transport, which is recognised as the main source of growth in emissions. 
This is because excise duties on petrol (gasoline) and diesel are high in 
Europe [The excise duties on gasoline in Germany is equivalent to €275.20 
per tonne of CO2]. Governments did not wish to risk the loss of this 
revenue, and environmentalists worried that if trading were substituted for 
the tax, the environmental achievements of the tax would be compromised. 
 
Competitiveness: Sectoral work shows that, at least in the short run, only 
sectors not in the trading scheme – and therefore not benefiting from free 
allowances – but importing electricity prices that reflected in part CO2 
allowance prices, such as smelters, would suffer competitive disadvantage. 
The ex post work supports this conclusion – so far, there is no evidence of 
negative effects on capped sectors, but high commodity prices and free 
allocation may mask potential effects. 
 
Allowance Price per tonne of CO2 per annum: In the pilot period, the combination 
of member state originating generous allowances, and abatement produced 
an initial price of up to €30 per tonne, but this fell over time to close to zero 
at the end of the period as it became clear in April 2006 that the market was 
over-supplied. The high price at the outset was a product of: willing buyers – 
utilities who had been left short, and unwilling sellers – the rest of industry, 
who had been left ‘long’; inadequate information – real data on supply 
demand balance only became available in April 2006; inability to carry 
forward –  bank – surplus allowances to Phase 2 (2008-12). 
 
Allowance value pass-through in Electricity prices: Another feature of the pilot 
phase of the EU ETS was the ‘passing through’ in unregulated markets of 
some of the market value of allowances into electricity prices, even though 
the allowances were given free of charge. This had the merit of signalling to 
consumers that they had to pay for the CO2 emissions associated with their 
consumption, but provided some utilities – notably those in Germany, the 
UK and the Netherlands, where the markets were unregulated – with 
 
35Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the Community and 
amending Council Directive 96/61/EC. 
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windfall gains. There is evidence that some utilities were capturing 
significant rents – some being able to pass 40-70 per cent of opportunity 
cost of allowances through in electricity price. (Sijm, Neuhoff and Chen, 
2006).  
 
Abatement: As the pilot phase took off, natural gas prices rose sharply – in 
the EU they are linked to oil prices – while coal prices did not increase 
proportionately. In the absence of the requirement for allowances, there was 
a strong incentive for utilities that could do so to bring relatively carbon 
intensive coal fired plant on line and move them up the dispatch order. But 
this required the acquisition of more allowances, which increased the costs 
of operating this plant, and this in turn in some cases changed the tradeoffs.  
So the CO2 market acted as wedge, limiting the extent of the default to coal, 
the calculus in some cases in favour of less carbon intensive natural gas. Or 
shifting from lignite (more carbon) to less carbon intensive hard coal.  
Independent estimates by Ellerman and Buchner (2008) and Delarue et al 
(2008) indicate that annual reductions from the counterfactual of about 50-
100 million tonnes of CO2 were achieved, and this is consistent with the 
overall performance documented by the European Environment Agency 
(2007). 
 
Trading Volumes: These grew from 262 million tonnes, valued at €5.97 billion 
in 2005 to 24.1 billion tonnes, valued at €1,500 billion in 2007.  
 
Allocation: it was mainly free, with only Denmark (5 per cent), Hungary (2.5 
per cent), Lithuania (1.5 per cent and Ireland (0.75 per cent) doing any 
auctioning. 
 
Inter-country Trades: The transfers between member states are maintained by 
the European Commission in the independent Community Transaction Log 
(ICTL). The UK and Spain were the big net buyers in the first Phase, while 
France, the Czech Republic and Poland were the big net sellers. But of 
course countries per se do not trade. They represent the aggregate of 
individual firm decisions.  
Table A1: Net Purchases and Sales of Allowances, by Value, During the 
First Phase (2005-07), EU ETS 
    
Country Net Purchases Country Net Sales 
 Million €  Million € 
UK -695 France +285 
Spain -353 Czech Republic +272 
Italy -294 Poland +176 
Austria -53 Netherlands +109 
    
Source: Phase 1 € Matrix, CITL European Commission. 
 
The major net buyers and sellers are presented in Table A1. The major 
net buyers were the UK and Spain, while France and the Czech Republic 
were the biggest sellers by value.  
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The European Commission reacted to this situation by reducing the 
allowance allocation by about 6.5 per cent for the second period 2007-2012 
and this has tightened up the market, yielding a price for 2008 vintage 
allowances of over €20 per tonne. A few member states substantially 
increased auctioning for the 2007-2012 phase, with major countries 
Germany (8.8 per cent), UK (7 per cent) and the Netherlands (4.0 per cent) 
leading the way (percentage to be auctioned in brackets).36 The Linking 
Directive allows firms to meet some of their obligations by purchasing 
certified emission reductions achieved in projects in developing countries 
and other developed countries.37  
A3. 
The Policy 
Response 
 
The Commission has tabled proposals for revision of the emissions 
trading Directive38 which include: cap tightening – stepwise reduction to 
achieve 20 per cent reduction by 2020; centralisation (’harmonisation’) of – 
cap fixing, allocation, monitoring verification and enforcement; auctioning 
of allowances (power and...); leakage provisions for the non-power sectors – 
more free allowances and/or ‘equivalent effort’ required of imports to EU; 
banking (including CERs) over 13 years – 2008-2020; new certified emission 
reductions (CERs) from the Clean Development Mechanism post-2012 
parked pending UN agreement; exclude small-scale installations (but 
equivalent effort?); effort sharing – distribute 10 per cent of auctioned 
allowances to poorer Member States; central control of any new entrant 
reserve. 
 
Thus the policy response has been to address the weaknesses that became 
manifest in the pilot phase. 
 
36Ellerman and Joskow (2008), p. 38. 
37Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of Ministers amending the 
Directive establishing a scheme for greenhouse gas emission allowance trading within the 
Community, in respect of the Kyoto Protocol’s project mechanisms - COM (2003) 403 
final. 
38See: footnote 5 above and http://ec.europa.eu/environment/climat/emission/ 
pdf/com_2008_16_en.pdf 
ANNEX B: 
INSTALLATIONS IN THE 
EU ETS IN THE 
REPUBLIC OF IRELAND 
 
Table B1: Installations in the EU ETS in the Republic of Ireland 
Operator Name Location Relevant 
Emission 
Proposed Annual 
Allocation  
(2008-12) 
Annual 
Allocation as Per 
Cent of Relevant 
Emission 
  1. ESB Moneypoint Powergen 5,503,257 (H) 3,735,390 68 
     
  2. ESB  Poolbeg Powergen 2,263,394 (H) 1,536,301 68 
     
  3. CRH plc  Platin, Drogheda 
(Cement) 1,560,507 (PR) 1,497,743 96 
     
  4 Limerick Alumina 
Refining 
Aughinish (Alumina and 
Powergen) 
1,262,740 
(H,P,P) 1,143,865 91 
     
  5 Quinn Cement Co Cavan 1,049,531 (PR) 1,007,319 96 
     
  6 ESB Tarbert Powergen 1,474,055 (H) 1,000,529 68 
     
  7 CRH plc Irish Cement Limerick 890,660 (PR) 854,837 96 
     
  8 Viridian Power  Huntstown, Finglas 
Powergen 1,187,160 (P) 805,796 68 
     
  9 Synergen Ringsend Powergen 1,131,166 (PR) 767,790 68 
     
10 Tynagh Energy Tynagh Co Galway 
Powergen 1,089,348 (PR) 739,406 68 
     
11 Huntstown Power 
Co. Finglas 1,061,651 (PR) 720,606 68 
     
12 ESB  Shannonbridge 
Powergen 1,021,370 (H) 693,265 68 
     
13 Edenderry Power Edenderry Co Offaly 
Powergen 923,229 (H) 626,651 68 
     
14 ESB  Aghada Powergen 774,301 (H) 525,564 68 
     
15 ESB Lanesboro Powergen 753,673 (PR) 511,563 68 
     
16 Lagan Cement Kinnegad County Meath 530,862 (PR) 509,511 96 
     
17 ESB North Wall Powergen 478,706 324,926 68 
     
H = Historical; PR = Pro rata; P=Projection. 
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GETTING OUT WHAT 
YOU PUT IN 
An Evaluation of Public 
Investment in Irish Sport 
Pete Lunn 
 
 This paper presents an economic analysis of the returns to public investment in Irish 
sport, which has increased dramatically over the past decade. It combines figures on 
spending by central government and state agencies with a relatively new and rapidly 
expanded body of research on participation in sport. The aim is to use what has become a 
substantial evidence base to assess whether Irish sports policy is likely to meet its stated 
aims of improving health and quality of life. Empirical findings support the view that there 
are significant health and social benefits to be had from participation in sport. However, the 
analysis challenges the way current policy addresses three trade-offs in the allocation of 
resources: the balance between “elite” and “grassroots” sport; the trade-off between 
investment in sporting facilities (physical capital) and participation programmes (human 
and social capital); and the allocation of public money across the range of different sporting 
activities. In each case, given the stated aims of policy and the evidence base, it is difficult to 
justify the current position. The paper concludes that the allocation of public investment in 
sport needs to be updated in light of recent findings.  
Abstract 
 
 This paper is motivated by a number of developments that have taken 
place in sports policy. First, successive budgets have delivered substantial and 
sustained increases in the level of public funding for sport over the past ten 
years. According to the Revised Estimates for Public Services 2008, the total 
allocation of central government funds to the sport budget of the 
Department of Arts, Sport and Tourism (DAST) in 2008 amounts to €311 
million.1 Second, as the benefits of increased physical activity are becoming 
more apparent, governments and academics are taking sport more seriously. 
An expanding international research effort is seeking to understand the 
forces that drive participation in sport and the potential of policy to increase 
participation. Third, there has been an accumulation of evidence regarding 
grassroots sport in Ireland over the past five years, largely as a result of the 
1. 
Introduction 
 
1 The focus of this Budget Perspectives paper is on central government funding of sport. Local 
authorities also provided additional public funding for sport and recreation, estimated to be 
€122 million in 2005 (Fitzpatrick Associates, 2005). 
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research programme funded by the Irish Sports Council. This programme is 
itself a creation of sports policy, since conducting such research was made a 
statutory obligation of the Council when it was established in 1999. The 
focus of the research programme has been, primarily, to improve 
understanding of the social and economic forces that surround various kinds 
of involvement in sport.  
 
The body of research that has now accumulated, internationally and 
domestically, is sufficient that it is possible to analyse Ireland’s much 
expanded investment in sport in the light of evidence; to make use of 
information and insights that were not available when the majority of current 
policy mechanisms were designed. The aim is to employ the available 
empirical evidence to assess returns to the increased public investment in 
sport. 
 
The domestic research base draws heavily on three data sources. The 
Survey of Sport and Physical Exercise (SSPE) surveyed a nationally 
representative sample of 3,080 adults over 18 years of age in 2003 (see Fahey, 
Layte and Gannon, 2004, for details). The Quarterly National Household 
Survey (QNHS) module on Sport and Physical Exercise surveyed 
approximately 40,000 people aged 15 years and over (Central Statistics 
Office, December 2007). The Irish Sports Monitor (ISM) is a survey of over 
10,000 respondents carried out for the first time in 2007 and described at 
length in Lunn, Layte and Watson (forthcoming). These surveys and the 
research reports based upon them have adopted a broad definition of 
“sport”, taken from the Irish Sports Council Act, 1999, which covers all 
kinds of recreational exercise activities, such as swimming, jogging and going 
to the gym, as well as traditional field games like soccer and Gaelic games. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes the scale and 
objectives of public funding for sport, raises three relevant research questions 
and outlines some theoretical and methodological issues that arise in trying to 
employ evidence to answer them. Sections 3, 4 and 5 address each question 
in turn. Section 6 concludes. 
 
 The scale of increases in public funding of sport delivered by successive 
budgets over the past decade is apparent from Figure 1, which charts the 
total DAST sport budget over the period 1998-2008. Although the budget is 
expressed in nominal terms, the more than ten-fold increase in ten years is 
pronounced, even by the standards of public spending increases during this 
period of economic boom. Particularly large increases in spending are 
apparent in 2002 and 2007.  
2.  
Public 
Investment 
in Sport: 
Scale, Aims 
and 
Evaluation  
Given this substantial rise in funding, it is natural to examine the aim of 
the additional investment and to look for evidence regarding returns on that 
investment; or, more simply, to what degree sports policy meets its 
objectives. 
 
The current stated goal of sports policy, adopted in the DAST Statement of 
Strategy 2008-2010 is: 
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To increase participation and interest in sport, to improve standards of performance 
and to develop sports facilities at national, regional and local level, thereby contributing 
to healthier lifestyles and an improved overall quality of life, through a Departmental 
policy and resource framework in partnership with its Agencies, other Government 
Departments and the National Governing Bodies of Sport.  
 
Figure 1: DAST Budget for Sports and Recreation Services, 1998-2008* 
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*Figure for 2008 is estimated. 
Source: Department of Finance, Revised Estimates for Public Services, 1999-2008. 
 
There are two aspects of this stated goal that require careful consideration. 
First, the strategy assumes that the four actions listed (to increase 
participation, to increase interest, to improve standards and to develop 
facilities) contribute to the two benefits claimed (healthier lifestyles and 
improved quality of life). Second, the implication of the statement is that 
these actions pull together to achieve the benefits. The DAST strategy does 
not consider the possibility that there may be tensions between the four 
actions, in terms of competition for resources and for the attention of policy-
makers. The remainder of this section deals with these two issues in turn. 
 
With respect to the impact of sport on health and quality of life, there is 
now a large international literature that attempts to measure the benefits of 
sport and physical activity. (For review and references relevant to the Irish 
context see Fahey et al., 2004; Delaney and Fahey, 2005; Lunn, 2007; Lunn 
and Layte, 2008). Research mostly focuses on the link between participation 
in sport and health, although the possibility that participation in sport 
promotes social capital has also been examined. The evidence for a link 
between physical activity, including sport, and reduced risk of disease is 
strong. The World Health Organisation (2005) lists physical inactivity as one 
of the seven leading risk factors associated with the development of serious 
disease, including some forms of mental illness as well as some of the most 
threatening physical conditions, such as heart disease and certain forms of 
cancer. That said, there are also some negative health outcomes associated 
with sport, such as the risk of serious injury and a link between team sport 
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and drinking alcohol (e.g. Fahey, Layte and Gannon, 2004). But the balance 
of evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of the idea that playing sport is good 
for health.  
 
In the Irish context, Lunn and Layte (2008) employ a statistical model to 
estimate the physical health premium associated with regular participation in 
sport.2 They find that the better health enjoyed by those who currently play 
some form of sport is, on average, equivalent to the health benefit of being 
14 years younger.3 Hence the health benefit of playing sport may be very 
significant. A further aspect worth emphasising is that the gap in measured 
health status between people who play no sport and those who play some 
regular sport is considerably larger than the gap in health status between 
those who play at differing levels of intensity (Fahey et al., 2004). That is, the 
evidence suggests that the greatest health gains may be had where people 
make the transition from playing no sport to playing some sport, rather than 
where people who are already active participants increase their involvement 
further. These findings, therefore, suggest that the biggest health gains occur 
when sport attracts new participants.  
 
The social benefits of sport are much more difficult to define and 
measure. The case is usually made in terms of the contribution of sport to 
‘social capital’, meaning that the aesthetic side of sport, such as the simple 
pleasure of watching “the beautiful game”, is underplayed. Moreover, there is 
no agreed definition of ‘social capital’, nor method of measuring it. Roughly 
speaking, social capital refers to the degree of social interaction and shared 
understanding enjoyed by individuals within communities. Because sport 
mostly brings people together, it is usually assumed (especially by proponents 
of active sports policy) that sport enhances social capital. Any such increase 
in social capital would accrue not only to players, but to other types of 
participant; the volunteers, club members and spectators who also come 
within the social circle of sport. Based on the 2003 SSPE, Delaney and Fahey 
(2005) record that, in the year prior to the survey, 15 per cent of Irish adults 
volunteered for sport-related activity, 30 per cent were members of sports 
clubs and 46 per cent had attended some kind of sports fixture. It is this last 
group that may have enjoyed not only a social event, but an aesthetically 
pleasing one – although, admittedly, there is no guarantee of that. The 
numbers compare with 43 per cent in the same survey who had played sport 
during the same period (excluding walking). Hence, any social benefits 
associated with these non-active forms of participation accrue to proportions 
of people that are comparable with the proportion obtaining the health 
benefits associated with playing sport.  
 
Still, it is also possible that sport may enhance some social divisions. In 
Ireland, the assumption that “sport is good” has been questioned by Liston 
(2007), who argues that Irish researchers are ideologically inspired and hence 
prone to look for and measure only positive aspects of sport, ignoring 
negative aspects such as gender and class divisions, or the economic cost of 
 
2 Health benefits were measured using the SF-12 measure of physical health (Jenkinson and 
Magee, 1998). 
3 It is not possible to determine the degree to which this association is due to the effect of 
playing sport on health, as opposed to the effect of being healthy on the likelihood of 
playing sport. In reality, causality is likely to run in both directions. However, Lunn and 
Layte (2008) also show that there is a significant association between current health and the 
amount of sport played in the past.  
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physical injury. It may well be true that personal attitudes and beliefs partly 
determine the questions researchers ask, but such sociological theorising is 
no substitute for empirical evidence. As outlined above, the case for health 
benefits derived from sporting activity is very strong. Delaney and Fahey 
(2005), meanwhile, offer a balanced discussion of evidence relating to social 
benefits and costs associated with sport, including those Liston (2007) claims 
to be ignored by researchers. They conclude that the positive social 
contribution of participation in sport is likely to outweigh the negative. The 
onus is on those who argue otherwise to do so with workable evidence rather 
than idle theory. 
 
Some insight into the balance between the health and social benefits 
associated with sport can be had simply by asking those who play sport what 
they get out of it. Figure 2 shows that health is the primary motivation for 
the majority of participants, while social benefits also rank well ahead of 
narrower sporting goals, such as improving performance or participating in 
competitions.  
 
Returning to the stated aim of policy in light of this discussion, the 
contention that increased participation in sport provides benefits is in 
accordance with evidence. This is especially true in relation to the health 
gains from playing sport, but likely to be the case for social benefits also. The 
evidence, therefore, supports the idea that public investment in sport is very 
likely to bring health benefits where it increases the number of active 
participants, and likely to provide social benefits too, including for 
volunteers, club members and spectators. The contention regarding the 
benefits of sport, as laid down in the DAST strategy, is consequently 
accepted for the remainder of this paper. 
Figure 2: Main Motivation for Active Participation 
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Source: QNHS module on Sport and Physical Exercise, 2006. 
 
 
The second issue raised above must now be addressed: are the strategic 
actions of policy, as stated, mutually supportive rather than in competition 
with one another? On one level, arguments can be made that increasing the 
level of participation, heightening interest in sport, raising the standard of 
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sport and improving the quality of facilities are all complementary actions. 
Each could, in principle, have a positive knock on effect for the others. 
Economic theory, on the other hand, leads us to a colder view. Resources 
spent on one type of policy are resources not spent on another – investment 
in one area comes with the opportunity cost of not investing elsewhere. The 
way priorities are balanced against one another is therefore crucial. Thus 
arises the central question: is the range of policy mechanisms funded out of 
the DAST sport budget an efficient way to capture the benefits associated 
with sport? 
 
There are three types of trade-off, in particular, that policymakers must 
grapple with. The first is the balance between funding allocated to elite sport, 
which primarily benefits top sportspeople and the spectators who enjoy 
watching them, and funding given to grassroots sport, which benefits 
participants at all levels. The second concerns the level of support directed at 
different types of programme for developing grassroots sport; more 
specifically, what exactly the public money pays for (pitches, salaries, 
buildings, marketing etc.). Lastly, there is the balance that must be struck 
when deciding levels of funding for specific sporting activities. 
 
Economic theory provides a framework for how these trade-offs might be 
resolved efficiently. In principle, the marginal return on each different type of 
investment should be equated. Thus, if funding is allocated optimally, an 
additional sum spent on, for instance, support for elite athletes, should bring 
the same benefit as the same additional sum spent on, say, employing a 
development officer to encourage sport among the socially disadvantaged. If 
marginal returns on different types of investment are not equated, then there 
is a strong case for transferring resources to fund the policy with the higher 
marginal return. Of course, this nugget of economic theory is good in 
principle, but less valuable in practice. Taking the example above, how can 
one measure and compare the positive impact on a small group of elite 
sportspeople and those who enjoy watching them with the positive effect of 
getting a group of disadvantaged people active in sport? An element of 
subjective judgement is inevitably involved. 
 
Furthermore, while such orthodox economic theory focuses on efficiency, 
there are also issues of equity. Men are more likely to play sport and are 
hence greater beneficiaries of public money invested therein. Lunn (2007) 
finds that people with higher educational attainment and income are many 
times more likely to play sport. Indeed, socio-economic status turns out to be 
at least as significant as gender and age in determining who plays sport. 
Moreover, strong socio-economic gradients are not confined to sports often 
perceived as the preserves of higher social classes, such as sailing and golf. 
Participants in Gaelic games and soccer are also disproportionately better 
educated and better off. These findings are important, because where public 
funds are used primarily for the benefit of those who are already involved in 
sport, especially where the funding is drawn from the National Lottery rather 
than general taxation, policy is very likely to be regressive – a transfer of 
resources from the worse off to the better off. In summary, considerations of 
equity place even greater weight on the importance of using public funding 
to attract new participants, in particular those in less advantageous socio-
economic positions.  
 
There is one further consideration to take into account when making 
judgements about the relative benefits of different streams of public funding. 
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In addition to the health and social benefits of participants, a case can (and 
often is) made for investing in elite sport in order to gain national prestige. 
That is, there may be benefits to many citizens arising from the performance 
of Irish nationals on prominent sporting stages. Where public funding 
increases the haul of Olympic medals or boosts the performance of a 
national team, a large number of people may take pleasure from watching or 
reading about the events, or even simply from being aware of them. Such 
benefits are, of course, very hard to measure.  
 
Still, evidence is available to assist comparison of sports policy 
mechanisms. The example above, comparing a scheme for supporting elite 
sportspeople with a scheme for getting disadvantaged people to take up sport 
is particularly difficult, because it requires us to consider both efficiency and 
equity, and to compare the experiences of active participants with those of 
spectators, potentially involving large audiences and a contribution to 
national pride. These more tricky issues arise primarily where returns to 
funding for elite sport must be compared with those from funding grassroots 
sport. When comparing different policy mechanisms directed specifically at 
grassroots sport, the conceptual problems are not so severe and objective 
evidence can play a greater part. 
 
 For present purposes, “elite” sport refers to competitive sport that occurs 
on a national or international level – top national leagues, international 
competitions and so on. “Grassroots” sport refers to local competitions and 
people who play recreationally. Of course, the distinction is blurred not clear. 
Lesser leagues and competitions feed higher profile ones; players who start 
out participating for fun with a local club end up as international stars. But 
the distinction is workable for present purposes and sheds much light on the 
current allocation of public funding for sport. 
3.  
Elite v. 
Grassroots: 
An Uneven 
Contest?  
 
The appropriate balance between the funding of elite and grassroots sport 
is, as described in the previous section, partly down to subjective judgement. 
However, whatever one’s view on the matter, it is important to know how 
the balance is struck at present. Establishing this is a non-trivial task, which 
requires us to disentangle the different streams of public funding.  
 
Figure 3 provides a breakdown of the DAST sport budget for the period 
1998-2008 (left) and for 2008 alone (right). The two separate charts are 
provided to show that, while the level of funding has increased dramatically, 
there has been relatively little change in its structure over the period. 
Proceeding clockwise from the top, the Sports Capital Programme (SCP) 
provides money for the construction or improvement of sporting assets – 
pitches, changing facilities, sports halls etc. Grants are given out to clubs or 
community groups (schools may only apply in conjunction with such groups) 
in response to applications. The great majority of grants are given to sports 
clubs and community organisations of long standing. There is a separate 
fund, the Local Authority Swimming Pools Programme (LASPP), which pays 
for the restoration or building of public swimming pools. These two 
programmes, each dedicated solely to the provision of facilities, have 
accounted between them for over one-third of all spending on sport over the 
last ten years. By comparison, the chart reveals that the Irish Sports Council 
receives less than one-fifth of the total sport budget. Moving on to major 
venues, three one-off projects have accounted for a substantial share of 
available funds: Croke Park, Sports Campus Ireland and the redevelopment 
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of Lansdowne Road. The latter is the primary reason for the larger share of 
the budget allocated to this category in 2008. Lastly, the Horse and 
Greyhound Racing Fund (HGRF), established in 2002, completes the 
picture. 
Figure 3: Components of the DAST Budget for Sport 
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Source: Department of Finance, Revised Estimates for Public Services, 1999-2008. 
 
This subsidy to the racing industry has been the specific focus of a 
previous Budget Perspectives paper (Fahey and Delaney, 2006), which 
questioned the validity and scale of this contribution from the taxpayer, 
which is made in the absence of measurable public benefit. No more need be 
added here except to note that the HGRF, the majority of which is paid out 
to owners in prize money, significantly exceeds the entire budget allocated to 
the state agency with primary responsibility for increasing the level of 
participation in sport, namely the Irish Sports Council. It remains a matter 
for those who support this subsidy to explain how it provides greater 
benefits for wider society, given the absence of evidence from which any 
such a conclusion can be drawn.  
 
The proportions of the sport budget allocated to the HGRF and to major 
venues represent funding for “elite” sport, since their purpose is to provide 
national training and performance space for top-class sportspeople and the 
spectators who watch them. The SCP and the LASPP, meanwhile, represent 
funding for grassroots sport, since they pay for local facilities used by 
participants at all levels in very many locations around the country. Thus, in 
order properly to assess the balance between funding for elite and grassroots 
sport, it is necessary to further analyse the work of the Irish Sports Council, 
as its remit covers both mass participation and support for elite sportspeople. 
This task is made more difficult by the fact that the Council supports a very 
large range of schemes and has expanded that range significantly as its 
funding has grown. Summary figures for 2007, produced by grouping 
different schemes run by the Council, result in the picture given in Figure 4. 
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Figure 4: Components of Irish Sports Council Funding 
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Almost half of the Council’s budget is given out in grants to the National 
Governing Bodies (NGBs), which oversee the development of more than 60 
different sports.4 Of this expenditure, however, nearly half goes to a 
combination of the Gaelic Athletic Association, the Football Association of 
Ireland and the Irish Rugby Football Union, under the heading of the Youth 
Field Sports initiative, the stated aim of which is to support young people’s 
involvement in these team games. Given that there are roughly 60 other 
NGBs, this represents a strong bias in funding in favour of these traditional 
team sports. Regarding the balance between elite and grassroots sport, the 
degree to which the NGBs focus on each varies by sport. Under the Youth 
Field Sports initiative, funding is specifically given for the encouragement of 
greater participation and so can be considered funding for grassroots sport. 
For the remaining governing bodies, grants cover administration, the 
employment of staff, development activities and, in the words of the Council 
“…may also include hosting events and programmes aimed at increasing 
participation rates” (Irish Sports Council, 2005). Hence, it may cover efforts 
to attract new people or the cost of supporting elite performers. 
 
Some 21 per cent of the Council’s budget is dedicated to participation 
programmes, where the explicit aim is to get people playing sport who are 
not currently doing so, including separate initiatives for women and older 
people. Also included in this category is funding for the Local Sports 
Partnerships, a national network of county-level organisations dedicated to 
increasing participation at a local level. Finally, 31 per cent of the Council’s 
 
4 These range from well-known bodies, such as the Athletic Association of Ireland, to less 
well-known ones, such as the Irish Amateur Archery Association or the Irish Hang Gliding 
and Paragliding Association. 
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budget is allocated in a variety of grants to elite sportspeople and sporting 
organisations, most notably Grants Under High Performance and the 
International Carding Scheme.5 
 
Having disaggregated the budget of the Irish Sports Council, it is now 
possible to combine the information contained in Figures 3 and 4 to produce 
a different kind of breakdown of public funding for sport in 2008. Making 
the assumption that the proportions of the Irish Sports Council’s budget 
devoted to different types of scheme will not change greatly between 2007 
and 2008, we can approximate, fairly accurately, the current state of play 
regarding the funding balance between elite and grassroots sport. The 
outcome is presented in Figure 5. “Provision of facilities” covers the SCP 
and LASPP. “Participation programmes” covers Local Sports Partnerships, 
the Irish Sports Council’s targeted participation schemes and the Youth Field 
Sports Initiative. “NGBs” covers the grants to governing bodies other than 
the GAA, FAI and IRFU. “Elite Sport” covers the HGRF, funding of major 
venues and the Irish Sports Council’s various schemes for elite sportspeople. 
Figure 5 reveals that 62 per cent of the current sport budget goes to elite 
sport. A further 5 per cent goes to the NGBs and so a significant proportion 
of this is also spent on elite sport. The striking conclusion is that the level of 
public funding directed to elite sport in 2008 is very nearly twice that devoted 
to grassroots sport. Of the money that does go to the grassroots, the large 
majority is spent on facilities, such that there is a strong dependence on the 
provision of physical capital as the primary policy mechanism to encourage 
participation at a grassroots level.  
Figure 5: Estimated Balance Between Funding for Elite and Grassroots 
Sport, 2008 
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5 This scheme supports Ireland’s most talented sportspeople by providing access to a range 
of back-up services and direct assistance to meet international qualifying and competition 
criteria. 
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It is possible to construct an argument for or against this division of the 
sports budget, depending on one’s point of view. If national prestige and 
benefits to spectators are valued more highly than the benefits of active 
participation or local participation (in all forms), then this allocation of 
funding can be justified. But, given that the strongest evidence-based 
justification for public investment in sport is the health benefits that 
accompany increased physical activity across the population, and given the 
emphasis placed on these benefits in the DAST statement of strategy, the 
currently high concentration of public support on elite sport, rather than 
grassroots sport, is clearly questionable.  
 
 The analysis in the last section shows that the large majority of the public 
money devoted to grassroots sport is invested in facilities. Indeed, over the 
last ten years, public investment in facilities via the Sports Capital 
Programme (SCP) amounts to almost half a billion euro. Funding under this 
scheme peaked in 2002, when over €80 million was given in grants for 
facilities. Adding the contribution of the Local Authority Swimming Pools 
Programme (LASPP), investment in facilities such as pitches, pools, changing 
rooms, halls, courts and clubhouses totals more than €600 million over the 
ten-year period. This level of central government funding for sports facilities 
is unprecedented. However, its effect on participation must be considered in 
the context of other providers of sporting facilities in recent decades, 
including local authorities, voluntary organisations, private ventures and, 
perhaps especially, educational institutions. As described in Lunn and Layte 
(2008), the three previous decades saw a very large expansion of the Irish 
education system, focusing on second-level between the 1960s and 1980 and 
on third-level thereafter (Coolahan, 1981). New institutions and higher 
enrolment were accompanied by considerable investment in and improved 
access to sporting facilities provided by the education sector. 
4.  
Facilities v. 
People: Time 
for a 
Substitution? 
 
This context is important because economic theory suggests that 
investment in facilities is likely to be subject to diminishing returns. That is, 
because the first facilities to be built are more likely to be those where the 
need is greatest, the increase in participation per euro spent on facilities is 
likely to fall over time. As the applications for the SCP are judged in a 
competition based on merit,6 this logic would be likely to apply to the SCP 
projects also.  
 
What does the evidence say about the demand for new or improved 
sporting facilities? Note that the key issue here is not whether there exist 
sports clubs and other organisations that want public money for facilities and 
apply to get it, which of course there are. The issue is whether there is unmet 
demand among the wider public, especially the non-participating public. 
Ideally, we would have data that allowed us to compare the relative demand 
for facilities over time; to test the diminishing returns hypothesis and to put 
the current level of demand in context. Such data is not available. However, 
 
6 This assumption has been strongly questioned by Considine, Crowley, Foley and O’Connor 
(forthcoming), who find that for the period 1999-2007, the counties represented by the 
Minister for Arts, Sport and Tourism and the Minister for Finance did disproportionately 
well out of the SCP. However, this effect is unlikely to impact strongly on the logic of 
diminishing returns since, over the period of time in question, such inefficiencies in 
distribution tend to even out and, furthermore, the majority of applications countrywide 
would not be affected.  
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all three of the recent large-scale national surveys of sporting participation 
include questions that shed light on demand for facilities in recent years and 
presently. The SSPE in 2003 recorded that just 1 per cent of non-participants 
in sport cited lack of local facilities as the main reason for not participating 
(Fahey et al., 2004). Time, motivation and health problems were the main 
reasons cited. Given the emphasis in sports policy on the provision of 
facilities, this finding may well have come as something of a surprise to 
policymakers.  
 
We now have evidence from two other national surveys involving even 
larger samples. Figure 6 charts the main reasons for non-participation as 
given by non-participants in the 2006 QNHS module. The pattern is 
strikingly similar to that found in the SSPE. These findings do not preclude 
the possibility that building more sporting facilities will increase the level of 
participation in sport, but they certainly suggest that there is not excess 
demand for sporting facilities waiting to be met. 
Figure 6: Main Reason Given for Non-Participation in Sport and Exercise 
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Source: QNHS module on Sport and Physical Exercise, 2006. 
 
The QNHS survey also asked respondents whether the provision of 
certain specific facilities in their area might encourage them to participate, or 
to increase their levels of participation if they already played some sport. The 
answers are summarised in Figure 7. For nearly three-quarters of non-
participants and half of participants, the provision of more facilities appears 
to be an irrelevancy. Where there is any measurable demand for facilities at 
all, it seems to be for swimming pools, places to walk and gyms/fitness 
centres. This offers a potential justification for the LASPP, as it suggests 
there may be some return to building more swimming pools. But its 
implications for the effectiveness of the much larger public investment via 
the SCP are uncomfortable, especially given the specific types of sporting 
facilities that it funds (see below). 
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Figure 7: Additional Facilities That Would Encourage More Participation  
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Source: QNHS module on Sport and Physical Exercise, 2006. 
 
This analysis could be criticised on the grounds that the questions being 
asked of the respondents in these surveys are hypothetical – perhaps people 
do not really know what affects whether or not they participate in sport. A 
module designed for the 2007 Irish Sports Monitor, therefore, found a different 
way to approach the issue. The questionnaire asked those who participated in 
sport whether they had experienced any difficulty finding suitable local 
facilities at the time when they took their sport up. The answers are depicted 
in Figure 8. Very few people had any difficulty locating facilities where they 
could pursue their chosen sport. 
 
Given these findings from three separate data sources, it seems very 
unlikely that the provision of more sporting facilities in Ireland will lead to a 
significant increase in the number of people playing sport. There may well 
have been a period during the last several decades when new and improved 
facilities did lead more people to play sport. We do not have historical data to 
confirm this, but the logic of diminishing returns implies it. Either way, 
evidence suggests the current return to investing in facilities is likely to be 
low. It is of course possible that those who get to play sport at improved 
facilities may enjoy the experience more, but if the greater aim is to increase 
levels of participation, alternative mechanisms for investing in sport need to 
be considered. 
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Figure 8: Difficulty Experienced by Participants in Finding Suitable 
Facilities  
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Indeed, there is a large international research literature that addresses the 
question of which policy interventions are likely to lead to increases in 
participation. Given the size of this literature and the many different 
methods of policy evaluation involved, it is helpful to consult meta-analyses 
of the findings. At the national level, the Carter Report in the UK (Carter, 
2005) looked at published evaluation of the policy frameworks employed by 
countries that have successfully raised the level of participation in sport over 
a sustained period, most notably Canada and Finland. The report noted two 
common aspects of their success: the constant monitoring of participation 
levels and the use of long-running public awareness campaigns to promote 
the benefits of sport and exercise. That said, at a national level, while it is 
possible t
licies.  
 
To be more confident of the influence of policy, analysis needs to move 
to the measurement of outcomes before and after the introduction of 
specific policy interventions. A large scale meta-analysis of specific policy 
interventions was conducted by the Task Force on Community Preventive 
Services (2001), set up by the US Department of Health and Human 
Services. Although limited to research in the English language, this task force 
identified 94 high-quality studies that had reliably measured participation 
before and after the intervention. The task force concluded that there was 
evidence to support an impact on levels of participation for five types of 
policy intervention: increasing the amount of sport in school curricula, 
launching community-wide campaigns that mix organised events and 
marketing; organising sporting activities through new or pre-existing social 
groups; offering individually tailored physical activity programmes; and 
improving local facilities and access combined with outreach activities. Thus, 
the policy interventions it found to be measurably successful employed 
ongoing social contact or initia
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pa
they face. In other words, the evidence suggests that 
ccessful policy to raise participation requires investment in human and 
so
the size, goes to those who already participate. Given the socio-
conomic profile of participants revealed in Lunn (2007), this transfer, much 
of 
 of funding). LSPs will 
e more effective if they devote resources to providing alternative and 
vidence-based programmes for increasing participation, rather than acting to 
reduce the efficiency of pre-existing national policies. 
 
rticipants. Provision of facilities or opportunities in the absence of such 
communication was not effective. 
 
Taking all of the Irish evidence on facilities in combination with the 
international evidence on successful policies, the strong reliance of sports 
policy on the provision of facilities is at odds with the evidence base. The 
primary barriers to involvement faced by non-participants are time, 
motivation and health. There appears to be very little demand among the 
wider public for extra sporting facilities. Solutions that have worked in other 
countries involve communication with non-participants, which may well help 
in tackling the barriers 
su
cial capital rather than physical capital – people and communication, not 
buildings and pitches.  
 
Placing this conclusion in the context of the breakdown in public funding 
provided in Section 3, it is apparent that only a small fraction of the overall 
sport budget effectively targets new active participants. Even if one makes 
optimistic assumptions regarding the proportion of their budgets that NGBs 
spend on programmes to encourage and assist new participants to get 
involved, only around 10 per cent of the total sport budget is spent on 
schemes that the evidence base suggests are most likely to produce the 
highest returns in terms of increased participation. Furthermore, the evidence 
suggests that the proportion of the budget spent on facilities, which is more 
than twice 
e
which originates from the sale of lottery tickets, is likely to be substantially 
regressive. 
 
Part of the 10 per cent spent on participation programmes is allocated to 
the newly formed national network of Local Sports Partnerships (LSPs); 
county-level organisations that aim to coordinate local resources and 
marketing, so as to increase participation in sport. In principle, such 
organisations are the kind of policy mechanism that evidence suggests has 
the best chance of raising participation. A recent review of LSP performance 
(Fitzpatrick Associates, 2005) produced some encouraging findings in terms 
of levels of LSP activity and international precedents, but noted what a small 
fraction of the budget LSPs account for. Furthermore, a note of caution is 
warranted regarding LSPs. One role many of them have taken on is to help 
organisations in the preparation of application forms for grants under the 
SCP. From an individual club’s point of view, this may appear helpful, but 
from a national perspective, this activity is almost certainly wasteful. Not only 
does it again prioritise the provision of facilities rather than programmes for 
increasing participation but, more importantly, the process of applying for 
SCP grants is a zero-sum game. If all areas improve the quality of 
applications then the same grants will be awarded at the cost of greater effort 
in preparing applications. If areas where greater effort goes in to applications 
for SCP grants actually do receive a higher level of funding, then facilities are 
allocated not on the basis of need but on the basis of where LSPs assist 
applicants (although the DAST review of LSPs concluded in 2005 that such 
assistance did not, in any case, seem to increase levels
b
e
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 The primary measure used to assess returns to investment in sport in the 
international literature and in this paper is the participation rate for playing: 
the proportion of people who actively participate in a given sport within a 
given time window. The measure has the particular advantage that it is easy 
to define and to measure with surveys. It also has a number of disadvantages. 
First, it measures only whether people have had an experience, not the 
quality of that experience. Second, it measures only whether people have 
taken part, not how frequently or how intensively they have taken part, both 
of which would be likely to impact upon associated health and social 
benefits. Third, by focusing on playing rather than volunteering, spectating or 
club membership, it is probably a better proxy for health benefits than for 
social benefits. On the other hand, where investment in sport improves only 
the quality of the sporting experience rather than the numbers who benefit 
from it, the participation rate remains an indication of how widely those 
benefits are distributed. Furthermore, increases in the participation rate for 
playing can be expected to be positively correlated with increases in other 
forms of participation. Thus, the level of participation is a very useful but 
somewhat limited 
5.  
Sport v. 
Sport: Wh
Tops th
o 
e 
Table? 
proxy for measuring the benefits associated with 
vestment in sport. 
 
w participants. The first of these is clearly easier to measure than 
e second. 
 
HS survey). Both 
appear to have increased in relative popularity since 2003.  
 
in
Moreover, the rate of participation for specific sporting activities is an 
important indicator of intrinsic popularity, while changes in the participation 
rate indicate whether the popularity of a specific activity is rising or falling. 
From the point of view of public investment, this is important information. 
To increase levels of participation requires either increasing the rate at which 
people take up sport, or decreasing the rate at which they drop out. Thus, to 
maximise participation, funding for each sporting activity should be 
influenced by the numbers who participate, because that is also the number 
of potential dropouts. Funding should also account for the likelihood of 
attracting ne
th
Again, all three surveys of sporting participation offer information 
regarding the relative popularity of different activities. Figure 9 provides 
participation rates for the most popular eight sporting activities (excluding 
walking) in the SSPE 2003, QNHS 2006 and ISM 2007 surveys. Despite the 
differences in survey methodologies (see Figure 9 notes), a consistent picture 
emerges. The four most popular activities (exercise, swimming, golf and 
soccer) are the same for the four surveys. The biggest differences between 
the surveys surround the relative popularity of two particular activities: 
exercise (a category that includes going to the gym, “working out”, aerobics 
and keep-fit) and jogging (counted as athletics in the QN
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Figure 9: Participation Rates for Top Eight Sporting Activities from Three Surveys 
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Notes:  
(1) ‘Swimming’ includes Aqua-aerobics; ‘Golf’ includes Pitch and Putt; ‘Soccer’ includes Five-a-side; ‘Exercise’ 
includes aerobics, keep-fit routines and going to the gym; ‘Cycling’ excludes cycling for transport;  ‘Athletics’ 
includes jogging and cross-country; Walking is excluded; ‘Dancing’ was not included in the QNHS and SSPE 
surveys. 
(2) Reference periods vary between surveys. For the SSPE and QNHS, respondents were asked about any sport 
played in the previous 12 months. For the ISM, the reference period was the previous 7 days, leading to lower 
participation rates. (Since the ISM interviews were conducted evenly throughout the year, this 7-day period does 
not introduce seasonal bias in the activities recorded.) 
(3) Lower participation rates for the QNHS arise because the figures refer only to people’s “main sporting 
activity”. The other two surveys allowed individual’s to be counted in the participation rate for more than one 
sport. 
(4) The SSPE sample is adults aged 18-plus, QNHS adults 15-plus and ISM adults 16-plus. 
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Lunn and Layte (2008) conducted further analysis on trends in 
participation, employing a particular section of the SSPE 2003 survey, which 
collected information about individual sporting histories. Respondents were 
asked about any sporting activities they used to participate in regularly, 
including when they started the activity and when they stopped. From this 
information, individual sporting histories were constructed that allowed the 
effective reconstruction of the recent history of grassroots sporting 
participation over several decades. (For detail on the methodology and 
associated problems and controls, see especially Lunn and Layte, 2008, pages 
5–9). Surprisingly, strong trends in participation emerge from this analysis, 
which are summarised in Figure 10. 
Figure 10:Mean Annual Participation Growth for Adults (Age 20-39 Years) 1984-2003  
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Source: SSPE, 2003 (Lunn and Layte, 2008). 
 
Growth in exercise activities and jogging far outstrips that in other 
sporting activities. From the perspective of consistency between the surveys, 
this result is pleasing, as a continuation of these trends explains the changes 
in relative popularity recorded across the different surveys. There are two 
other notable aspects to the trends identified. First, participation in sport is 
rising. Second, it is rising much faster for individual sport and exercise 
activities than for traditional team sports. Broadly similar trends were also 
found for children’s sport, although the traditional team sports generally 
account for a larger proportion of children’s participation. 
 
Greater insight into the forces of change at work here can be had by 
looking at how participation in sport varies across the life course. Lunn and 
Layte (2008) compared the individual sporting histories collected in the SSPE 
2003 by cohort, separately for team and individual sports. Figure 11 plots 
participation rates for three cohorts in the two types of sport across the life 
course. 
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Figure 11: Participation Rates for Team and Individual Sport Across the 
Life-course by Cohort 
 
 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50
Age
%
18-29 Team 30-49 Team 50+ Team
18-29 Indiv 30-49 Indiv 50+ Indiv 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: SSPE, 2003 (Lunn and Layte, 2008). 
  
This analysis provides a striking illustration of the trends in participation 
in grassroots Irish sport. The most recent cohort of young adults is playing 
considerably more sport, but while participation is generally increasing, it is 
doing so much more quickly for individual sports. Moreover, as people 
progress through adulthood, the likelihood that they play a team sport drops 
rapidly, while the likelihood that they play an individual sport remains fairly 
constant. From this analysis, Lunn and Layte (2008) calculate that marginally 
more children play team sports than individual sports, but the gap is not wide 
and is narrowing, while over three-quarters of all adult sport (over 18 years) 
consists of individual sporting activity and this proportion is increasing 
further. Multivariate modelling of the rates of take-up and drop-out from 
adult sport reveal that those who play team sports are over four times more 
likely to drop out from sport than those who play individual sports. The 
differential in the rate of take-up of individual versus team sports is too large 
to measure accurately, as beyond the age of 20 so few adults take up a team 
sport. 
 
How does public support for different grassroots sporting activities 
compare with this picture of participation rates and how they are changing? 
We know from the break down of the Irish Sports Council budget in Figure 
4 that the three main NGBs for traditional team sports attract considerably 
more funding than the NGBs for other sporting activities. But the greater 
part of the budget allocated to grassroots sport is via the SCP. Figure 12 
shows a detailed distribution of grants under the SCP for the period 1999- 
2002, which was compiled for the SCP expenditure review (Department of 
Arts, Sport and Tourism, undated). It is not possible to determine precisely 
which sports benefited from the grants for Community/Mixed use facilities, 
although many of them were for community halls that could be used for a 
variety of purposes and the usage of which may have in any case changed 
since the grant was awarded. For this period, the greatest beneficiaries of the 
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SCP by some distance were GAA clubs. The main team sports (Gaelic 
football, hurling, soccer, rugby) accounted for 55 per cent of all grants. 
Figure 12: SCP Funding for Specific Activities 1999-2002  
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Source: Sports Capital Programme Expenditure Review 1999-2002 , p.33. 
 
For more recent periods, it is difficult to produce the equivalent analysis, 
but possible to approximate it. The SCP grants awarded by DAST in 2007 
and 2008 amount to just over €135 million. They are broken down in Figure 
13, which also includes the investment for these years in swimming pools, 
expressed as a percentage of the total SCP grants. The analysis differs slightly 
from Figure 12, because without access to individual grant applications, it is 
difficult to produce accurate figures for grants to Community/Mixed use or 
Athletics, as it can be unclear simply from the recipient of the grant what 
sporting activity is benefiting. The predominance of GAA clubs in receiving 
grants is greater still than for the previous period, opening up a more 
substantial gap with soccer. Meanwhile, the main team sports have also 
marginally increased their share of grants further, to just under 60 per cent of 
all grants. 
 
The logic of the current pattern of public investment across different 
sporting activities is hence difficult to fathom. Levels of funding seem to be 
dictated not by estimates of participation levels and trends but by other 
concerns. Although soccer and swimming are faster growing and more 
popular sports than Gaelic games, they receive less in the way of funding. 
More generally, Gaelic games, soccer and rugby dominate as recipients of 
public funding, both via the Irish Sports Council and the SCP. It is true that 
children are marginally more likely to play team sports than individual ones, 
but the gap is not large and those who play team sports are very much more 
likely to drop out from sport altogether as young adults. Furthermore, these 
team sports have a particularly strong gender bias – the gap in participation 
between males and females is much larger than for most sports. Lastly, many 
adults take up individual sports and almost none take up team sports, such 
that adults as a whole play almost three times as much individual sport as 
team sport. If the aim of public investment in sport is to increase 
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participation, it is appears to be difficult to justify the current distribution 
across different activities. 
Figure 13: SCP Grants for Specific Sporting Activities, 2007 and 2008 
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Source: DAST, SCP grants 2007 and 2008; Department of Finance, Revised Estimates for 
Public Services, 2008. 
 
It could be argued that the distribution of funding reflects not only the 
health benefits that might accrue to players, but also the social benefits that 
accompany volunteering, club membership and attendance at fixtures. Levels 
of non-active participation in Gaelic games are higher than in other sports 
(Lunn, Layte and Watson, forthcoming) and the GAA has an unparalleled 
degree of social organisation that other sports might aspire to (Delaney and 
Fahey, 2005). More generally, team sport accounts for the large majority of 
spectating. However, even if one accords social participation in sport the 
same value as active participation, a position not easily accommodated by 
available evidence, the disparity in funding between the GAA and all other 
sports, and between the main team sports (Gaelic games, soccer and rugby) 
and the rest, is far wider than can be justified by participation rates. 
 
Another argument that could be made in favour of the present relative 
funding levels is that team games played when young lead to higher levels of 
sporting activity in later life. However, multivariate analysis of the sporting 
life-course does not confirm this hypothesis. Those who play only team 
sports as young adults are some four to seven times more likely to drop out 
from sport altogether as young adults (Lunn and Layte, 2008). 
 
A similar case that might be made for the funding bias in favour of Gaelic 
games is that for cultural or historical reasons these sports are entitled to 
special treatment. This argument is difficult to evaluate without a concrete 
idea of the supposed benefits concerned, which are not included as a goal of 
policy in the DAST strategy. 
 
A final argument that could be advanced is that there is some benefit 
associated with team sports that does not apply to individual sports. It is 
sometimes said that the cooperation and camaraderie involved in team sports 
is character building, or confers some other psychological benefit or lasting 
lesson in life. Yet it is also possible to make the opposite case. The degree of 
72 BUDGET PERSPECTIVES 2009 
active participation in team sports can vary across the team, with the better 
players getting the lion’s share of the play and a number of people 
participating primarily as substitutes. The problem with these arguments is 
that they are speculative. They are no foundation for evidence-based policy. 
 
More straightforwardly, whatever basis determines funding should be 
explicit. As things stand, the DAST strategy states clearly that the aim of 
policy is healthier lifestyles and improved quality of life. Given the evidence 
presented here, it is difficult to reconcile this aim with the present funding 
allocation across different sports. 
 
 The analysis presented here has questioned whether the current allocation 
of public investment in sport produces the desired returns, in terms of the 
potential benefits associated with participation. Evidence supports the stated 
justification for public investment in sport, namely the health and social 
benefits of participation, especially with respect to the health benefits of 
active participation. However, three specific research questions were raised 
regarding whether the current allocation is likely to capture these benefits. 
Each was addressed using the available evidence. 
6. 
Conclusions 
 
First, current policy devotes almost twice the amount of public money to 
elite sport it devotes to grassroots sport. This places a very high emphasis on 
the social benefits associated with spectating and with national pride in the 
achievements of top players. It is hard to see how these benefits can be 
judged to be greater than the health and social benefits associated with mass 
participation, both active and non-active.  
 
Second, of the funding that is allocated to grassroots sport, the large 
majority is spent on facilities. Empirical evidence, on the other hand, 
suggests that there is little demand among the wider public for more facilities 
and that provision of more facilities is not the best way to increase levels of 
participation. There is a strong case for moving away from the provision of 
physical capital to funding the human and social capital associated with sport. 
International evidence suggests that communication with non-participants 
(through for example the organisation and marketing of events, targeted 
programmes and new opportunities) is more likely to raise levels of 
participation. 
 
Third, by far the biggest share of public investment goes to traditional 
team sports, especially Gaelic games. Yet these are not the most popular 
sports, nor the fastest growing, and they suffer from very high rates of 
dropout in early adulthood compared with individual sporting activities, 
many of which receive little or no public support. It is not at all clear what 
rationale is responsible for this distribution of funds, which is not in keeping 
with the stated aims of policy.  
 
If the primary aim of sports policy is to capture the benefits of sport for 
the wider public, these three balances within the allocation of public 
spending on sport need to be re-examined.  
 
To a degree, however, the current situation whereby policy is at odds with 
the evidence base is not surprising. Although the level of funding for sport 
has increased dramatically over the past ten years, the policy mechanisms it 
supports have not. Moreover, much of the research is relatively new and it 
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takes time to absorb and respond to the messages it contains. The 
information and insights of this new research have resulted from sports 
policy itself, which specifically set out to learn more about sporting activity in 
Ireland when it established the Irish Sports Council and gave it the duty of 
carrying out such investigation.  
Nevertheless, the picture provided by the research findings is now 
consistent across several large-scale surveys and is also in keeping with 
international evidence. There is, therefore, a strong argument for revisiting 
the fundamental basis for public investment in sport and bringing policy 
more into line with its evidence base and stated aims. It is up to policy-
makers whether and how they choose to respond. 
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